THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Rift in the Big Three

IT IS NOW PLAIN to all the world that relations among the three chief powers—the United States, Great Britain and Russia—have worsened alarmingly in the last few weeks. While Roosevelt was still alive he acted as mediator between two stubborn men, Churchill and Stalin, each of whom was determined to have his way, men who clashed on point after point, and notably as to whether the Anglo-American invasion of Europe should be in the Balkans, as Churchill wished, through territory which the Russians regard as their sphere of influence, or through France. Since Roosevelt's death, Mr. Truman has entrusted matters largely to Stettinius; and Stettinius has taken advice, to an unfortunate extent, from the bitter anti-Soviet bloc in the State Department. It is now revealed that the United States, and not Latin America, was chiefly responsible for the admission of Argentina to the San Francisco Conference. The action was regarded by the Russians, and by many independent observers, as part of an attempt to create a solid Western Hemisphere alignment of conservative capitalist countries, as an offset to Russia and to Russian-dominated Eastern Europe.

Russia doesn't like our continuing to play with Franco long after any possible military or other excuse for doing so has passed. The Russians find their cynical expectations about capitalist democracy fulfilled as we continue to aid the Right and suppress the Left, in Greece, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. They accuse us of being much too tender with German war criminals, including those German industrialists who had simultaneous ties with the Nazis and with British and American businessmen. One can imagine the ironic thoughts of the Russians when the American delegation at San Francisco allowed itself to be put on record as quibbling over the ultimate ideal of independence for colonial peoples, and full employment for everybody, even though it afterward explained that these quibbles were not meant to be so bad as they sounded.

The Russians in their turn have some things on their record which one must regret. There is a good case to be made for admitting the component republics of the USSR to the United Nations Assembly, but it is a case for all sixteen of them, and not merely for two. As for the matter of the arrest of the sixteen non-Communist Poles, if the Russians have a sound defense, they have thus far not bothered to make it public; and that fact indicates a discouraging ignorance of, or contempt for, the role of public opinion in the Western countries. The fact that the French and American Communists have dropped the coöperative line they have followed since June 22, 1941, may be taken as a strong hint that the Russians consider things have greatly altered since V-E Day.

On the other hand, certain items seem to be to their credit. Developments at Trieste suggest that Stalin has halted Tito in his swashbuckling attempt to seize Trieste and present the Allies with a *fait accompli*. After an embarrassing delay, Great Britain and the United States are apparently to share in the supervision of Austria. Even as to the reorganization of the Lublin government of Poland, no one can now say definitely that the Russians are responsible. It is reliably reported that Stalin and Churchill are in flat

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disagreement as to the terms of the Yalta Agreement. Churchill insists that the Lublin government was to be scrapped in toto, Stalin that it was only to be expanded and reorganized; it is believed that Mr. Roosevelt accepted the Stalin interpretation. Leaders of the British Labor Party, who are in a position to know the facts, seem to be much disturbed over Mr. Churchill's conspicuous renewal, since V-E Day, of his old hostility to Russia.

On the right side of the ledger, so far as concerns all of the Big Three, is the fact that differences at San Francisco on nearly all major points have now been reconciled. The only issue still unresolved is the desire of the small and middle-sized nations that the unlimited veto of the Big Five in the Security Council shall be modified in regard to official investigation of a dispute between two small powers. Marshal Stalin is strongly opposed to this, perhaps believing that there is no such thing in the modern world as a dispute between two small powers in which one or more of the great powers is not in the background. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that this problem, like others, will be solved by a weasel-worded compromise, and that the San Francisco Conference will be a success inside the technical and limited scope of its objectives. To be sure, it has done practically nothing about removing the causes of war; no power has given up any of its sovereignty or shown the least intention to do so; no power has even hinted at relinquishment of those nationalistic policies which in the past have been a fertile cause of international conflict. Nevertheless, the San Francisco charter, if it is ratified by the powers—as it probably will be—will hold an umbrella over us for a few years during which the world can make the real effort to reorganize for peace.

The statement above is subject to one all-important qualification. The charter will serve this purpose only if the Big Three continue to work in harmony. The whole plan of the Security Council is based on the assumption of this continuing coöperation. That is one reason why the present rift between Russia on one side and the United States and Great Britain on the other is so disturbing. The men in the American State Department and the British government who are following an anti-Russian course are not merely weakening a temporary alliance, but jeopardizing the whole idea of international collective security.

The other reason for regretting the present turn of events is that, although many people in Washington and London seem to have forgotten it, the war is not over. We still have a dangerous enemy to fight in the Pacific, and for that purpose we need the Russians, either to act as intermediaries in arranging an early peace on extremely harsh terms for Japan, or to join in the war, shortening it by many months and saving thousands of American lives. Thereafter, in the postwar era, Russia and the United States need each other. Russia needs our money and machinery to help rebuild her shattered economy. She needs the assurance of a reasonably friendly Western world so that she can abandon the militarism with which she has been cursed for a quarter of a century. We need an understanding with Russia to avoid having the world broken into two camps, the Russian and the Anglo-American, with all the danger of war that such a division implies.

It is high time for President Truman to speak out on this matter. Even before he meets with Churchill and Stalin, he should make a radio address to the American people and to the world, reaffirming the fact that the United States has no fundamental quarrel with Russia and certainly none that cannot be settled by friendly discussion. He should repudiate the actions of the anti-Russian bloc in the State Department and promise to remove them from their posts, replacing them by individuals whose attitude toward Russia will be one neither of slavish admiration nor of pathological hostility. He should pledge that, in so far as any recent actions of this government have been based on animosity to Russia, they will be canceled or offset to the utmost possible extent. He should pledge further that the American government recognizes that the future depends in overwhelming degree upon the joint attitude of the United States and Russia and that this country will do its part to make that future one of prosperity and peace.

Military Review

THE QUESTION of defeating the Japanese armies on a large scale without incurring the high casualty rates of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns has so much exercised people's minds lately that there is a kind of popular movement, not dissimilar to the "Second Front" drive of 1942, in favor of putting a sea and air blockade down on the enemy as the easiest road to victory. The Foreign Economic Administration has thrown a needed dash of cold water on this idea with its statement that the Japan-Korea-Manchuria complex is short of no essential war material and that Japanese war industry is so well dispersed that it is unlikely to be uprooted by bombing.

The matter of the casualty rate in close fighting (the Japanese seem unable to get the same results in open-field warfare) remains. There is a suggestion in some of the captured Japanese documents published in the military press that the correct solution lies in the tactical rather than the strategic realm, and a suggestion from the fighting on Okinawa that the commanders there have taken cognizance of this. The documents were estimates of the quality of the American troops they faced, drawn up for the high command by Japanese officers at the front. They speak of

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the excellence of American mechanical equipment and the manner in which our troops rely upon it; they describe our formations as very dangerous where they have room to maneuver and quick to adopt new methods; they call the American soldier "deficient in spiritual strength," which presumably means they have discovered that our men do not blow themselves up with grenades in positions where a Jap would do so.

But the most interesting comments are that American troops are not good at hand-to-hand fighting, particularly at night, and that at night our men also move too much, make too much noise about it and keep poor guard. Japanese methods, both on Okinawa and Iwo, have apparently been dedicated to the truth of these propositions. (It must be remembered that they are relative and that a German probably would not agree that Americans are poor fighters close in.) The Japanese have defended nothing but positions where caves and rough ground cancel the value of our mechanical weapons to some extent, reduce the power of our artillery and constrict the space available for maneuver. They invariably counter-attack at night, seeking close combat and using grenades very freely.

The proceedings in the recent attack on Yonabaru would indicate, however, that our leaders do not need to have their attention called to the idea that American night fighting and hand-to-hand combat could be improved. The Seventh Division was put in there after having been withdrawn for two weeks of "rest." Anybody who has been near an army knows that these rests between actions are usually devoted to some fairly intensive advanced training in the light of combat experience, and either this was the case here or the divisional officers completely reconsidered their tactical doctrine during the period. When the Seventh was put in again, it promptly attacked without a preliminary barrage, at night under pouring rain, and in hand-to-hand fighting broke through the flank of the line that had held so long. One would willingly have more details on this little achievement, which is even more important for its future promise than for its immediate results.

The Japanese also are showing some capacity for learning, as is evident from the loss figures in the two latest fire-bomb attacks on Tokyo, of 12 and 19 planes respectively. These figures are insignificant compared to those for heavy bombing missions over Germany and probably do not represent losses at a dangerous level, but the planes lost were the big and expensive B-29's, and the evidence of increasing efficiency in the Japanese defenses is no doubt giving our command some concern. It is not clear just what means of defense caused this sudden jump in the loss figures. Correspondents' reports from Guam speak of Baka flying suicide bombs launched at the big machines from the normal Japanese Betty plane, but say specifically that none of the B-29's was hit by them; there was heavy flak and fighter opposition, but no heavier than on other occasions.

Probably the Japs are using their Bakas as the Germans did their rocket-firing fighters—not so much as the main weapon of attack, but to force the B-29's to break formation, after which they are attacked by more conventional fighters. It would not be the first time that the Japanese have used ingenious adaptations of German devices or methods, and it leads to the speculation that the time factor being about right, one of those big submarines carrying aviation plans may actually have got through to Japan.

New Blood in the Cabinet

Every President is entitled, broadly speaking, to the cabinet he wants, and newly appointed men are entitled to a reasonable period in which to prove themselves. Bearing both these reservations in mind, we confess that on the whole we are rather disappointed with Mr. Truman's three new cabinet choices. The best of the three is Judge Lewis Schwellenbach as Secretary of Labor. Judge Schwellenbach is an outstanding liberal and a good executive; he ought to make the Department of Labor the important government agency it deserves to be.

The President acted wisely in combining the War Food Administration and the Department of Agriculture. His choice for Secretary, Representative Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, is intelligent, industrious and affable. He is more of a compromiser than a fighter, and in spite of his inquiries into the food situation, he has not had much experience with agriculture.

Tom Clark of Texas is a conservative Democrat, who, like Anderson, is more of a compromiser than a fighter. His past record suggests he is far less concerned for civil liberties than Mr. Biddle, whose place he takes.

In general, President Truman is appointing orthodox machine politicians to important posts. At least two of these three men are protégés of Robert Hannegan, head of the Democratic National Committee and the new Postmaster General. This is of course the way President Truman's mind works, and the result is not necessarily or altogether a bad one. Members of a machine who will pull together, and with Congress, may accomplish more than brilliant but uncoördinated individuals who spend most of their time fighting one another and the people on the Hill. The really important question is the direction in which the well coordinated machine decides to move; and as to that, President Truman and his new cabinet members should be given a fair chance to prove themselves.

Bretton Woods Narrowed

The Banking Committee of the House of Representatives, in reporting favorably the Bretton Woods agreement, inserted a number of amendments which

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satisfy the American Bankers' Association. They may easily be unacceptable to Britain and the other nations concerned.

A council is to be created to lay down policies for the American delegates to the International Monetary Fund and the Bank. The council would consist of the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and others. This, by itself, may be desirable and harmless. The American delegate is to ask the Board of the Bank whether it so interprets its charter as to include the right to make stabilization loans. If it does not, the American delegate is to ask for amendment of the agreement. The Board will probably do so, however. The American delegate is to ask the Board of the Monetary Fund whether it will allow the Fund to be employed to rectify fluctuations of exchange values due to seasonal or cyclical irregularities, depression or persistent export of capital. If it intends to do any of these things, the American delegate is to seek to have the agreement amended to forbid such practices. Finally, the American delegate must obtain the sanction of the council previously mentioned before he can vote that the dollar is a "scarce currency." If any currency is declared "scarce" by the Fund, the other nations may ration its use among themselves, as the Sterling Area has been rationing dollars during the war.

The amendments as a whole obviously seek to deprive the Fund of most of its function and place the main burden of stabilization on loans to be extended by the Bank. It is difficult to see how any important exchange difficulties could arise from causes which did not include seasonal or cyclical variations, as well as long-term influences which the Fund was never intended to do more than cushion. And if the Fund could do no more than compensate for day-to-day changes, it would hardly be able to declare a currency "scarce." In other words, the Fund is rendered nearly useless, the ABA has come near accomplishing its purpose of defeating it, and the concessions offered to Britain's necessities are in large part withdrawn, while the commitments she made to obtain those concessions are unimpaired.

Reciprocal Trade Again

By passing the new reciprocal-trade-agreements bill, the House has scarcely plumped for free trade. The duties now in force average about the same as those enacted by the Fordney-McCumber bill under President Harding after the last war. Permission to reduce them another 50 percent, if the Senate also passes the bill, will bring us somewhere within hailing distance of a moderate tariff policy, provided the necessary agreements can be negotiated. It is significant of a change in American trade policy, however, that the tariff should be lowered after this war, instead of being raised as after the last one.

The great American industries no longer want protection; many of them, such as automobiles, have not had any. Read the hearings on the new bill and you will find testimony against it from such odds and ends of interests as zinc, manganese, jeweled watches, blown glass, nuts and raisins and other agricultural specialties. You will not find any impressive mobilization of those industries in which there is great investment and in which millions are employed to combat the proposal. Even the Republicans, who have a genius for being on the wrong side of every economic issue, were willing to continue the reciprocal-agreement method, but as usual brought up the rear in the country's progress by voting almost solidly against the permission to cut another 50 percent.

Another Communist Somersault

The American Communists are evidently in the process of changing the party line again. Up to the time when Germany attacked Russia, June 22, 1941, the war to them was only a struggle between rival imperialisms. The Communists not only denounced it; they actually sabotaged the American production of war materials. Since Russia entered the war as a result of the German attack, the American Communists have "coöperated" to the last degree. They embraced "free enterprise," even going so far as to reproach the *New Republic* when we were critical of American capitalists struggling with the British for possession of Arabian oil. The Communists not only pledged themselves not to strike during the war, but extended the pledge into the postwar era. Now, however, it looks as though the honeymoon between Earl Browder and the conservatives is about over. The *Daily Worker*, New York, has reprinted from a French Communist source a long attack on the policy of collaboration, accompanied by an editor's note from Earl Browder saying it deserves careful consideration. In the few days since this happened, Mr. Browder and other Communist spokesmen have gone out of their way to attack the Truman Administration, especially for its increasing coolness to Soviet Russia (though at the same time they continue to denounce those who say the Communist line is changing).

If the American Communists operated in a political vacuum, their wild gyrations and elaborate rationalizations would be merely funny, a welcome touch of comedy in a somber world. Long ago they lost all their adherents in the United States except the humorless hard core of fanatics, and abdicated a job the country badly needs—intelligent and sustained criticism of public policy from a viewpoint well to the Left. The serious thing about the matter is the fear that the Communist action reflects a growing distrust of England and the United States by Moscow. The American Communists have no pipeline to Stalin, as they have proved on repeated occasions; but this is

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much less true of the French; and even the American comrades can take a hint. It is better that Mr. Browder and his disciples should drop their hypocritical friendship with the National Association of Manufacturers; but in so far as the action reflects a worsening of relations between Washington and Moscow, this country should, as we point out elsewhere in this issue, take immediate steps to repair the damage that has been done to the Alliance.

An American Beveridge Plan

An "American Beveridge Plan" has now been introduced by Senators Wagner and Murray and Representative Dingell, which would broaden and deepen our present social-security plan in highly desirable ways. About 15 million persons would be included who are now left out—farm and household workers, employees of non-profit institutions, and the self-employed, such as business and professional men. Unemployment and disability benefits would be increased to a possible maximum of $30 a week for 26 weeks, for persons earning $3,600 annually or less. The states would be aided in providing health services, maternal and child welfare and aid to the blind, dependent children, the aged and other necessitous groups. The scheme also provides for prepaid medical and hospital care on a broad scale; nearly a billion dollars would be spent over a decade in increased health-center and hospital facilities. Payroll taxes would be increased to eight percent, shared equally between employer and employed, and some additional revenue from other sources might be needed in the long run. This is in its general outline an excellent plan. To be sure, full employment and high prosperity are better, in general, than social security; but the fact that we have the latter does not in any degree prevent our working toward the former. Here is a worthy goal for which all American progressives can fight in the coming months.

Reconversion Lifts the Bars

Reconversion has begun, and we are about to see how it will operate without much peacetime planning, under private enterprise. As soon as the military need for any products, materials or men ceases, they are released from such controls as priorities or allocations. Only price and wage ceilings remain. This procedure is contrary to that of the British, who will continue controls to see that the most important needs are met first, as war necessities shrink. In both cases there are large backlogs of demand, and plenty of purchasing power to buy whatever can be made.

Our guess is that while in neither case is there likely to be serious unemployment, the American practice will result in social and economic waste and a virtually irresistible pressure on price control. Competition for scarce materials and labor on the part of business interests will not necessarily allot them to the uses most needed by the population. Black markets will thus be favored. Already there is a strong campaign for relaxation of price controls. In any event, such pressure must be resisted until supplies equal the demand.

The Supreme Court and Divorce

Millions of divorced persons throughout the country have had the legal status of their divorces—and in many cases, of subsequent remarriage—upset by a Supreme Court ruling a few days ago. The Court said in effect that no American state is required to recognize a divorce granted by another state if the officials of State No. 1 believe that the legal requirements of State No. 2 were not actually fulfilled. For example, Nevada grants divorces only to bona-fide residents, and it takes six weeks to establish such a residence. In thousands of cases, a Nevada "resident" gets his divorce at the end of six weeks, leaves the state and never returns. If North Carolina considers such "residence" a legal farce—which in fact it is—it need not honor a Nevada divorce. There can have been few Supreme Court decisions which, however properly in accord with the law, have caused as much human misery as this one. The need for a single, nationwide federal divorce law is obvious; but the difficulties in the way are tremendous. Some authorities believe a constitutional amendment is necessary; but even if it is not, we must surmount the objection of the church organizations, which keep divorce as difficult as possible in the states they control, and fear that a federal law might be more lenient —as it probably would be.

French Empire Policy

The French, like the British and the Dutch, have no intention of granting independence to members of their Empire, or of placing any of their colonies under international trusteeship. The colonial powers are too much concerned with their future economic security and their political power to be willing to take any chances; they wish to be in the seat of management and are willing to assume the responsibility. This attitude is no doubt in large part a reaction to the fact that the two great non-colonial powers—the United States and Russia—have much larger areas and resources within their home borders.

The French, however, are pursuing a line of their own in planning how to deal with Empire questions. Unlike the British or the Dutch, they are not talking about "dominion status" or self-government as an ultimate goal. Rather they seek to solidify the Empire on a democratic basis. Manhood suffrage will be granted throughout its extent. At the center will be Metropolitan France; a separate governing body will be created for the Empire as a whole, composed of elected deputies. It remains to be seen how this plan will

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work. The strong desire for independence on the part of colonial peoples may clash with it. On the other hand, popular movements in the colonies may prefer empire democracy to native aristocracies, just as in earlier centuries the central king was the protector of the people against the oppression of feudal nobles.

Flare-Up in the Levant

The new wave of unrest sweeping through Lebanon and Syria after one and a half years of phony domestic peace, reëmphasizes the need for an international solution of the Levant problem and similar colonial questions. The French use of force, after a period of procrastination that could have been more profitably used to work out a policy acceptable to the Levant states, is both unwise and futile. The French are admittedly facing a difficult situation, but by trying to keep a solution exclusively in their own hands they have added to their difficulties rather than ameliorated them. Their promise of independence to the Levant states, which was contrary to the stipulations of the mandate and was of course an answer to the British encouragement of the Pan-Arab movement, is now becoming a boomerang. On the other hand, the unilateral and impatient steps taken by Syria and Lebanon to force a showdown, ironically enough with British aid, are equally ill advised. Independence in an interdependent world, taken by itself, does not and cannot mean freedom. If a *modus operandi* is to be achieved, it has to proceed from a new method of coping with situations such as that which now makes the Levant problem a hodgepodge of conflicting nationalisms, power politics and unilateral efforts.

People in the Limelight: Oscar L. Chapman

Oscar L. Chapman has completed twelve years as Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior. Sworn in on May 4, 1933, when he was 35, he was the youngest member of the so-called Little Cabinet. Now he is the only member of that original group still serving in the Little Cabinet, and he has been an Assistant Secretary longer than any other person.

Born a Virginian, Chapman entered Randolph-Macon College, but was there only a few weeks before he decided to join the navy, in which he served for three years in the First World War. When the war ended he spent some time in a government hospital in Denver. After his recovery, he studied law. Since then he has worked for three outstanding men: Judge Ben Lindsey, Edward P. Costigan and Harold L. Ickes.

In his early twenties Chapman was associated with Judge Lindsey as a probation officer in Lindsey's famous court of juvenile and domestic relations; later he was appointed referee for the court. After seven years, the young lawyer became a partner of Costigan. In 1933 Costigan, then a distinguished Senator, brought his young partner to the attention of Franklin D. Roosevelt and he was appointed to the post he has ably filled ever since.

Oscar Chapman has been an effective second to Secretary Ickes in his efforts to make the Department of the Interior the center of the government's conservation activities and to make conservation of our natural resources a normal and accepted policy. Of equal concern to liberals have been his sustained endeavors on behalf of the minority groups of this country.

Even before he came to Washington, Chapman was actively attempting to create a better life for the many citizens of Mexican descent in the Southwest. Since then he has worked consistently on behalf of Jews, and especially on behalf of Negroes. It was he, for instance, who first suggested, and with Secretary Ickes organized, the memorable concert by Marian Anderson at the Lincoln Memorial which was such an effective protest against undemocratic treatment of our Negro citizens. Time and again, with no thought of public credit or acclaim, Oscar Chapman has extended his hand to lift up the less fortunate among us. He has been a public servant in the truest sense of that word.

Britain Votes Again

THE DEPARTURE of Labor members from the National Government which has carried on the war for Britain, and the dissolution of Parliament, came as no surprise. The present Parliament was elected nearly ten years ago. In the normal course of events there would have been an election after seven years, even if the party in power had not lost a majority on a vote of confidence in the meantime. Labor has been res-



Fitzpatrick in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Warning to the United Nations

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tive in the coalition for some time, and it had been promised that there would be a new election soon after the end of the war in Europe.

Naturally there has been a good deal of speculation concerning the outcome. Labor has the advantage that during the war opinion has been drifting toward the Left, as it seems to have done in European democracies. In addition, many of the Conservative members will be easy marks, because they are closely identified with appeasement in the prewar period and with failure to prepare against the coming storm. In this respect their record is similar to that of the collaborationists in European nations overrun by German armies, though of course they were not so thoroughly compromised.

But Labor suffers disadvantages as well. It has no leader with the personal popularity of Churchill; indeed, there is a widespread feeling that its representatives have not the requisite stature, with the possible exception of Morrison and Bevin. The party needs the vote of many in the middle and professional classes to win, and yet is suspected of being too much a disciplined organ of the trade unions. Obviously its parliamentary delegation needs new blood just as badly as do the Tories. In so far as the record of the government during the war has aroused dissatisfaction, the Labor Party is not in a good position to benefit, since it was a part of that government and has to bear a share of the responsibility. And in so far as the reconstruction programs already announced—such as extended social insurance and the pledge of full employment—are favored, the Conservatives can claim part of the credit. The time between the dissolution of the government and the election is so short that it will be difficult to create an issue.

On the domestic front, Labor spokesmen can argue that after the last war the Conservatives failed to fulfill the glowing promises that were made during it, and that they are not to be trusted to carry out the necessary reforms. Laborites can bring forward their program for nationalization of coal and other basic industries, and compare it with the lack of any well formulated plans on the other side to deal with situations generally acknowledged to need drastic treatment.

In international affairs, Labor can make an issue out of the distrust that already exists concerning the bias of a Prime Minister who has always been opposed to democratic movements in other countries and seems more ready to play with kings and capitalist forces than with the people. If the war had been safely won when the Greek crisis arose, Mr. Churchill might have been ousted on that issue alone. It is a common comment that Mr. Churchill was unrivaled as a leader to rally the nation for war, but that he is not the man for peace.

Labor probably will not make an issue out of freedom for India and the colonies. The offer made by the National Government to India was the work of one of the Labor Party's own most prominent leaders—Sir Stafford Cripps—and the rejection of that offer, plus the subsequent hardening of factional lines in India, has created an opinion that the problem is extremely complex and difficult. The Empire may be necessary as the nucleus of a trading area to protect British employment against a depression in the United States, and public opinion will be slow to favor any relinquishment of the advantages it may offer, however liberal may be the sanctioned ideas of colonial administration.

One uncertain factor is the strength of the Liberal Party. It is trying to stage a come-back. It has an extremely well known and popular leader in Sir William Beveridge, who, though not a Socialist, in some respects stands further to the Left than many of the trade-unionists. The Communists also have a growing following and an efficient party organization. Labor has declined to make an electoral agreement with either Liberals or Communists, and hence the opposition vote may be sufficiently split in certain districts to permit the return of some Conservatives as minority candidates.

There is little doubt that Labor strength in Parliament will be considerably increased. It may even win a clear majority of the members, as it has never done in the past. If it does not, however, the situation will be confused. It probably will not join another coalition. If it assumes power as a minority, it will be in a difficult situation. A conservative government without its support would likewise have a precarious hold on power. In either event this election will probably be the precursor of another, in which issues will be better defined and new personalities will appear. For one thing is certain—whoever wins, Parliament will be full of new faces; younger men and women, many of whom have seen service in the war, will be there to help shape the future.

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A Journal of Opinion

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The German Road Back

An Inquiry into Guilt, Punishment and Expiation

IN A PASSAGE in *Death in the Afternoon*, Ernest Hemingway says that which is moral is what you feel good after. Hemingway was writing about bullfighting in Spain. It is the only "sport" which has survived into modern times in which men deliberately risk their lives, and in which other men enjoy not only the spectacle of a duel with death, but participation in it through identification with the duelists. In the bullfight, technique and skill, grace and beauty, courage and fear are present or absent in varying degrees; one thing is always present, absolutely, without degree or measure—death. Perhaps not all, but surely a large number of the spectators experience vicariously the jeopardy which ends in man's dealing death instead of dying; their triumph is a victory for man himself, for life itself; their survival is an antidote for anxiety, a reassurance that man who is "a reed, the feeblest in nature," can yet dominate nature. In Hemingway's definition of morality, the same element of struggle and survival is implied; morality is both *after* and *from*, and that which comes before is invariably some affirmation of life which, by a quality of absoluteness, intensity, even violence, reveals a victory over an ever present and ever menacing threat of the denial of life.

In the Middle Ages Spain gave the world an even more revealing ritual of the deadly duel by which man achieves symbolic reassurance, escape from his frightening longing for death, purification of his evil awareness of guilty sin: During the Inquisition some men accepted, even welcomed, the immolation of their bodies in order to save their souls; they died in the flesh so that they might live in the spirit. Sometimes torture induced the acceptance, but not always was torture needed to demonstrate the unworthiness of the body and the worth of the soul. Those who did not accept voluntarily —and in Spain and the Spanish world beyond the seas there must have been hundreds of thousands, if not millions—were in a position analogous to that of the bulls in the modern bullfights; lacking souls, blind to the need for salvation, they were destroyed to save the souls of their saviors, not only the men of the Inquisition but also the men and women of Spain and of the whole Christian world.

In his novel, *Darkness at Noon*, Arthur Koestler explored an area of modern political psychology which has some resemblance to medieval religious mysticism; he portrayed in the setting of a modern version of the *auto-da-fe* the emotional torture, intellectual submission and physical immolation of a Russian Communist who "confessed" and was executed. Whether or not Koestler's description of the thoughts and feelings of the human equivalent of the bull, of the victim in a political "sport" by now almost as stylistically formalized as the bullfight, has any accurate relationship to reality, there can be little doubt that the process, the modern rite of the mock trial, has as much to do with myth, magic, mysticism and religion as it has with justice, legality and politics.

There can be no doubt that in another, almost equally stylized rite, the political purge, the element of purification of the psychological mass or group is at least as important as that of punishment of the individual offenders against the social mass; or that symbolism and fantasy share roles with practical expediency and fact. No one can yet judge whether and to what extent the series of purges in the fifteen years before 1941 contributed to the firmness and strength of the Russians' faith in themselves in the five years of war. Nor can one yet decide whether the absence of some effective symbolic ritual of a catharsis of death-serving doubt played a part in the suicidal aspects of France's debacle. We can note, however, that in France, where the mock trial and the purge were unknown five years ago, they have appeared at a time when a widespread sense of national inferiority and insecurity creates a yearning for reassurance, and when a profound sense of personal guilt demands relief in symbolic purification. Apparently the French, who were the most reasonable, the least mystical, people in Europe, have found in their narrow escape from national death the need for the symbolic ritual of the duel with and defeat of death.

All of the duels have something in common, sacrifice —sacrifice of the lower to the higher, of the part for the whole: in the bullfight, of the bestial to the human; in the *auto-da-fe*, of the flesh to the spirit; in the mock trial, of the individual to the group; in the purge, of the group to the mass. In each case, the sacrifice removes a danger—the danger of the higher yielding to the lower, of the whole submitting to the part. While the result in every case is inevitable and inexorable, each duel is actually a contest if only in form: The bull cannot survive, but the man can be killed or spat upon; the victim of the Inquisition will burn, but the Devil may leave him in the form of a rat fleeing from the faggots under his pyre; the trappings of justice are in evidence at the mock trial; whether they are innocent or guilty, the condemned in a purge expiate the sin or error of the whole psychological mass of which they were a part. And the contest, rooted in the moral relationship of man with himself, is human, if not humane.

But what about the Germans? Can men who treat other men either as vermin or as inanimate, inconscient

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things, who exterminate them with neither a rationale nor a ritual, be understood by any standard of measure of man's duel with death and with the deadliness in himself? If morality is what you feel good after, if men can feel good even after killing their fellow men, what kind of men are they who feel nothing at all over millions of "extinctions" they have mass-made, who feel nothing over a processing of human carrion without passion, without psychological profit, with almost no practical purpose? Mysticism and psychiatry may conceivably provide answers to some of the questions about the Germans. Why did they continue to fight after military victory was patently impossible? Possibly because the pseudo-religious mysticism of the Nazis had spread so widely and penetrated so deeply that the Germans may have unconsciously welcomed a destruction of Germany's "body" so that her "soul" might be saved. How was it possible for them to believe the fantasy that they were Nietzschean supermen, above and beyond good and evil? Perhaps as psychological compensation for the fact that they had been welded into a mass of submen, passive, narcissistic, masochistic.

A mock trial is always public, a purge is always publicized; the "spectators" always participate in it emotionally. There can be no doubt that nearly all the Germans knew of such horrors as the extermination camps; yet they tell us that they did not know, or, if they knew, they "participated" by feeling nothing. It is almost as though they had lost the battle with death, with the deadliness in themselves; as though the life, not the death, had been exorcized out of them; as though they felt nothing about being accomplices after, if not before, the fact in a holocaust of every Christian sensibility because the humanity in themselves had rotted into atrophy; as though Nietzsche's all too human had become all too dehumanized.

Nearly all observers agree that the Germans, generally, feel no sense of guilt. Expecting and looking for guilt, then failing to find it, these observers also fail to note that the Germans simply do not feel. Their emotional apparatus is as idle as the machines in a motor-car factory after one set of dies has been destroyed and before a new set is installed; the Germans are waiting for the new dies, the new molds, the new forms for their feelings. We must furnish them. Is a sense of guilt one we should furnish? Will it serve our purposes? If our purpose is to make them suffer in the spirit as they have made others suffer in the flesh, there is much to be said in favor of inculcating a sense of guilt in the Germans. If, however, our purpose is to revive their atrophied humanity, to renew their Christian morality, not for their sake but for the sake of the rest of Europe and the world, there is a great deal to be said against it.

Those who favor the all-out large-scale campaign of guilt evocation—both our civilian and military propaganda agencies are already engaged in it—maintain that it will accomplish several ends, namely, satisfy the needs of retributive justice, make the Germans realize the justice of their punishment, dissuade the Germans from the desire to try another war. But this view fails to take into account the fact that the Germans, having for so long considered themselves above and beyond Christian good and evil, no longer have the feelings which give significance and meaning to Christian morality and justice: neither damnation nor salvation means much to a people who have been de-Christianized. In so far as we make them suffer in the spirit, they will suffer as Nazis not as Christians; instead of guilt's being shame, it will be regret that they failed to exterminate enough of us, and no one of our ends will be served. To be sure, they *will* suffer in the spirit, and in our eyes that will be just; but it will not satisfy the end of *retributive* justice; it will not help us by hurting them.

The guilt-evocation campaign is the wrong first step in the reëducation of the Germans because it skips over the prior need to start reversing the process of the demoralization of the Germans. Before we can inculcate feelings which have meaning only if they are based on Christian values, we must destroy Nazi "values." The core of these "values" is the notion that what is German is "good." Linked with this is the corollary notion that a German individual has no "being," no value except as a component of the mythically religiose construction, the German race-people-nation-state. What the priest-leaders of the hierarchy say is truth, what they do is justice, what they order is law. Communal participation with them in their intuitive inspiration, faith in them, obedience to them, militancy on their behalf, are the roads to grace. Whatever the practical and material explanations of Nazism may be, these pseudo-religious elements alone throw light on the problem of moral reëducation. The Germans feel nothing because the mainsprings of their feelings are gone. They must be replaced. How? Reason will not replace the irrational in a single step. Simple denial or reversal of Nazi "values" will tend to confirm them: it will not help to offer the notions that what is German is "bad," that only the German individual counts for us, that everything in Nazi Germany was false, wrong and illegal, that they were all blind and wicked. Above all, it will do nothing but serve to reinforce Nazi "faith" if we transform their formula of "the Germans against the world" into "the world against the Germans."

Those who support the guilt campaign maintain that we must explain to the Germans why their country and their nation were destroyed. "We did this," we shall tell them, "because of what you did to us and tried to do to us." They will answer: "Yes, we knew all the time this would happen to us unless we succeeded in doing it to you." There is no need to explain to the anti-Christian Germans the pre-Christian law of the talon—an eye for an eye; it needs no justification to men who have acted out the equation of countless non-Germans eyes for one German eye. The proponents of the guilt campaign say

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we must also explain the punishment which is yet to come. Here is the crux of the problem of moral re-education of the Germans, and here is the error of the guilt campaign. Guilt must not precede punishment, it must accompany and be linked directly and causally with punishment; if anything, punishment must come first. The Germans must suffer in the flesh if their suffering in the spirit is to restore them to Christian values; the fact of material punishment must give meaning to the feeling of guilt. Nazism offered a perverted system of rewards and punishments as the material foundation of its "values"; a sound system is needed. There are guilty Germans, there are Germans with varying degrees of responsibility, both of commission and of omission. Their culpability should be judged by clear, objective standards of legal measure; their sense of guilt, instead of being a vague, generalized attitude common to all Germans, should be an explicit attribute of the individual awareness of the specific punishment. For a specific wrongdoing, there should be a commensurate sacrifice—life, liberty, property, advantage. At the same time, there should be a scale of specific rewards, and in this scale the absence of punishment can itself be considered a reward. Not the fostering of feelings of guilt but the rapid provision by the military occupation authorities of an uncompromising but just, stern but humane, system of material, specific punishments and rewards is the first necessary step in a reformation of German values; the rules must be visible, knowable, unchanging, uniform. Obviously the system must be retroactive too, must provide jurisdiction and punishment not only for present and future wrongdoings but for all of the crimes of the Nazi past.

If guilt before punishment does little to nullify Nazi "values," guilt without punishment would do much to strengthen them. So would guilt without appropriate or adequate punishment, or guilt with punishment so long delayed as to weaken the link of causality. Large numbers of Germans remain prisoners of their own deluded hopes. After the last war they were made to believe that they had not been beaten on the field of battle but had been stabbed in the back. This time they know they have been defeated.

Guilt is as good a first step as any toward uniting the Germans, especially if it levels the differences and gradations of guilt among them. Without appropriate punishment, guilt tends to become masochistic self-punishment. Without adequate punishment, guilt tends to transform itself into sadistic aggressiveness; and the old German cycle starts over again. It is idle to assume that there will not be weak places in the links among the nations which will provide Germany's military government. One may punish more, the other less; one may punish certain crimes, another, others. There may be means of escaping punishment by playing one against the other. What could better serve the perpetuation of Nazi "values," hope for division of the enemy and another try, faith in the renewal of German unity and strength, than a wide corridor of escapism between Americans who preach guilt but do not punish as they preach and Russians who punish without preaching?

Undoubtedly agreement with the Russians on all points will be impossible; their civil and criminal codes are different from ours; politically we have no common basis of values and methods. Nevertheless it should be possible for their occupying forces and ours to present to the Germans a common front as united in essentials as we were during the combatant phase of the war against Germany. These essentials are: first, definitions of crimes; second, standards of legal judgment of crime; third, rapid arrest, trial and punishment of the guilty; fourth, elimination of all structural and methodological aspects of the Nazi system; fifth, reëducation of the Germans to eradicate Nazi "values." Problems of ideology as between the Russians and us will begin to emerge in the fourth category and become important in the fifth; they need not and should not in the first three. If we should disagree, however, we should agree to disagree, and go ahead with the urgent task of finding and punishing the Germans whom we, in our separate ways, consider criminally responsible. What has to be avoided is a contrast in essentials between the political morality the Russians stand for in Germany and the one we represent: in politics we shall certainly differ; in political morality we dare not. Instead of having the Russians begin arrests, trials and executions while we confine ourselves to propaganda campaigns, we should hold up our guilt-evocation until it can be synchronized with actual punishment. Then it will have an important role, for a sense of guilt in the same context with real punishment can become not a masochistic but an expiatory self-punishment, a means of revival of humanity and of renewal of Christian morality.

As a Nazi, the ordinary German who says he did not know of the sadistic brutality of the big criminals, was a criminal, was an inert, passive, masochistic unit in the monstrous mass of Nazism. Living in and being formed by the pseudo-religious atmosphere of Nazism, he neither existed nor felt as an individual; he existed in his communal participation in a tribal mob, recognizing no separate responsibility for his personal share. Only through painful expiation for a specific misdeed can a tribal unit become a human individual, can the Nazi German become a German with human feelings and Christian morals. The sum total of Germans who deserve punishment may include almost the whole population of Germany. Yet it is as an aggregation of separate individuals that the Germans should be made to accept responsibility. Individual responsibility, individual punishment, individual guilt and expiation—this is the path out of Nazi tribal

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collectivism. If we tell all Germans that they are guilty, implying an undifferentiated, generalized equality of responsibility, we provide a least common denominator of unity; if we fail to single out individual and differing responsibilities, we drive the Germans back into the Nazi corral.

When the Germans are again individuals instead of tribal units, the old problem of the German people will again present itself. And that problem we, as Americans, are singularly ill equipped to understand, since our very existence as a people is a denial of that alternation between self-contained racist tribalism and expansionist universalism which runs through German history. We made ourselves a nation by an act of faith and will supported by peaceful labor. The Germans are laborious, almost obsessed by the will to be a nation, but they have vacillated between being less than a nation and trying by force to be more than a nation. Their faith in themselves has revealed its weakness by its excessive protestations and by its need to deny the faith of other peoples. It seems almost as though the German has needed to consider himself unique among men, superior, godlike, not only because he has lacked faith in himself as a plain man among men but because he has lacked faith in man himself.

Nor is there the preordained pattern of symbolic sacrifice and expiation in the lived-out German version of the deadly duel of reassurance and purification. The Germans may start with scapegoats for the guilty sin and the death longing—as they did with the Jews—but they end by surrendering to evil and yielding themselves to death. Instead of a contest which ends in escape and relief from fear, the German version ends in submission. It is as though the bullfighter were to impale himself on the horns of the dying bull. It is the triumph of death itself. German literature, folklore, music and painting are full of the theme; it was less explicit in the historical life of the German people —although always there as an undercurrent, occasionally rising to the surface—until the Nazis came along. What the Nazis did was to abase the theme. They robbed death of its majesty and dignity, killing without dignity and dying without dignity.

We, the Americans, can make a start at disintoxicating the Germans of the Nazi poisons, we can begin their reëducation as members of the community of civilized mankind; but only the Germans themselves can face and conquer the old streak of tribal primitivism which has remained from their pre-Christian past and which Nazism was able to exploit. We can help them become "good" Germans again to the extent of making them pay for what was wrong or criminal in their conduct and of making them come to realize what was misguided in their attitudes; only they can make themselves normal modern men without mystical longings for godlike superiority, without appetites for death-serving communions. Is it too much to hope that the genius which produced buzz-bombs can contrive a psychological Pied Piper of Hamelin?

PERCY WINNER

Uncio in Midpassage

THE ICY, sobering wind of reality is whistling through the conference of the United Nations here this week with a chilling but salutary effect. During the first fortnight of maneuvers, events seemed to be occurring in what was, in effect, an international vacuum—a vacuum manufactured by the foreign offices of several nations in the hope that an effective peace-keeping machinery could be worked out almost in the abstract without the intrusion of the war and world revolution which made such machinery necessary.

As the conference of 49 nations enters its fifth week, Secretary of State Stettinius is flying to Washington to deal with the problems which have shattered the vacuum and added an urgency to events here. On the morning of the first day of this fifth week, Dr. T. V. Soong of China alone among the Big Four foreign ministers is still here—and only after a long absence in Washington at the beginning of the conference.

The temporary absence of Stettinius and the departure of V. M. Molotov and Anthony Eden are effective testimony to the blunt fact that events will not wait long for what is to be done here. And the delegations are absorbing this fact. There has been no violent or open opposition to the gentle efforts to cut short the interminable addresses in technical committees where diplomats of minor nations argued over the impact of a comma or a phrase.

The delegates are reading newspapers and, two weeks after V-E Day, now face the realization that unity among the Big Four is something that has to be worked for and developed, not something that can be accepted and assumed. Headlines mentioning "Trieste," "Lend-Lease" and "Poland" blackly underscored the transcripts of the committee meeting at which Andrei A. Gromyko of Russia defended the Crimea formula for voting of nations in the world security organization. The delegates were well aware that the fundamental premise of the organization projected first at Dumbarton Oaks was founded on the assumption of essential unity among the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China and, finally, France. But it took Gromyko to point out that unanimity might not be too great a price to pay for absence of another war, and that without

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adherence of this conference to the principle of great-power unanimity, there are certain first to be little frictions, then larger frictions, then catastrophe.

The possibility of this fatal progression of frictions was undoubtedly the pressure that sent Stettinius hurrying back to Washington. The same possibility is acting here as an annealing agent to bring the lesser powers into closer comprehension of what is going to make a world peace organization work, and is solving some of the problems.

The pieces of this world-encompassing jigsaw puzzle are now beginning to fall together. The design that emerges as they fall into place is not idealistic by any means, as is witnessed by the faltering American steps in the independence argument in the trusteeship plan and by Anglo-American reluctance to follow the labor leadership of Australia and New Zealand in a meaningful declaration for full employment as a world policy. And bit by bit, the conference is being jarred from abstractions to consideration of the harsh facts of international living—even though it won't do anything about these facts at this moment.

It was a hard blow for the academic atmosphere of the committee on trusteeship to have Prime Minister Faris al-Khouri of Syria and the Lebanese Minister of Interior, Wadih Naim, deposit the bitter case of French imperialism in the Levant on the doorstep of the conference this week. But the two chiefs of delegation could do no more here than put their case primarily before news correspondents and the bar of world opinion. The conference, by its rules, is not interfering in specific cases, and will presumably not interfere in this. But this plea for assistance drew a sharp arrow of world attention to the issue of independence that is being worked out by Commander Harold Stassen in his conferences with Lord Cranborne and A. A. Rostchin of Russia. It underlined the fact that the plans being created here are directed at human beings, not abstractions.

That has been true also of the Spanish, the Palestine, the Indian and the Korean issues, which persist in intruding despite the sturdy efforts of diplomats to keep them out. Everyone here is assured that the conference will not step over its own boundaries and do anything, but no one will deny that an emphasis on the facts of life is salutary.

The voices heard in the press conferences that occur every hour on the hour in the plushy hotel reception rooms are faint. But the questions that make Cranborne flinch a little and lead Stassen to reëxamine his principle of interdependence on the basis of the human aspiration for independence, are obviously the faint echo of the unheard voices of millions who cannot be here to state their own case.

The pressure of world opinion is making itself felt. The repercussions of the American decision to back Britain in her espousal of self-government as against independence were sharp and decisive. Within a few hours, the press reaction brought a statement from Stettinius making it clear that Stassen was talking for the delegation and not for himself when he adopted that position. And within a matter of days, this public reaction brought a realignment of position whereby an independence clause could be written for those areas which may fall under trusteeships in the new organization.

Without prejudicing the basic aspiration of dependent peoples for independence and self-determination, there is something to be said for begging the question at this conference of an all-embracing declaration for independence of all dependent peoples. The assignment of the delegates is to write a charter for peace-keeping. If a pledge of independence could be achieved without slowing or deadlocking this work, it would be a tremendous forward step. If it cannot be obtained, a promise of eventual independence for areas given in trusteeship is still a forward step, though not so tremendous. And there will still be the peace conference, where not even the cynicism of great powers can avoid the question of basic rights long alienated which is being so adroitly dodged at San Francisco.

The development of the impasse on independence of backward peoples emphasizes once again the impact of unpreparedness on this conference. With the sweat and sorrow and finally blood that have been spent on the problems surrounding the mandates of the old League, the question of trusteeship came up to the crucial moments here without adequate preparation.

When Stettinius led the American delegation into the Fairmont Hotel at the end of April, an American-delegation position had not yet been established—incredible as that might seem. Worse, there was no meeting of minds—hardly preliminary exploration—among the five great powers whose interests were vitally involved in whatever might be done. Although he may be charged with error in tactics and substance in permitting China and Russia to take moral leadership away from this country in advocating the historic American principle of independence, Commander Stassen still must be given the recognition that he struggled against overwhelming technical difficulties. His work in bringing together the first working document approximating agreement of the Big Five on this subject was an able legal feat and an effective drafting job.

But time is running out at the Veterans' Building, and the decisions that will shape the world organization are very nearly made. There will be some delays as the diplomats struggle to resolve decisions of substance into the formalized language of a world charter. Still, the pressure for completion increases daily. In the final rush for a finis, the pragmatic rule of "will it work" is quite likely to be paramount. A better rule well may be: "Can it be revised?"

San Francisco THOMAS F. REYNOLDS

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The Way to Full Employment

ON JANUARY 22, 1945, Senator Murray introduced a full-employment bill in the Senate on behalf of himself and Senators Wagner, Thomas and O'Mahoney. The Full-Employment Act of 1945 is certain to arouse attention and interest unequaled since the days of the NRA. Hearings are about to be held. Economists have been asked by Senator Wagner to express their views. Many government departments and privately organized groups are preparing for the titanic struggle to come. The cry of liberty versus security is being raised.

The full-employment bill marks a departure in economic objectives to be sought by this government. Provision of full-time employment for all seeking work; maintenance of our system of private enterprise; a rise in the standard of living of the American people; the full utilization of the national resources of the country—these are the major objectives. The responsibilities of the federal government under this bill include: the pursuit of economic policies and programs which will stimulate and encourage the highest feasible levels of employment opportunities through private and other non-federal investment and expenditure; and to the extent that continuing full employment cannot otherwise be achieved, the provision of such volume of federal investment and expenditure as may be needed to assure continuing full employment.

In order to achieve these objectives and fulfill governmental responsibilities, the bill provides that the President be required to transmit to Congress a National Production and Employment Budget. This budget will estimate the total number on the labor market; the aggregate value of expenditures required to provide employment opportunities for this number; the anticipated value of expenditures, private and public. If the last is not large enough to provide full employment, the President shall recommend legislation which will contribute toward filling the gap: monetary, trade, fiscal and other policies are to be examined. If this is inadequate, the government will suggest additional federal expenditures and investment adequate to provide employment for the potentially unemployed.

What should be the basic responsibilities of the federal government in the maintenance of continuing full employment after the war?

First, let us consider the case for full employment.

We all desire a high level of employment and, if possible, full employment. Full employment gives each individual who is able to work a stake in the flow of goods. For most of us that is the only manner in which we can obtain the required goods to provide us with the desired standard of living. Full employment, moreover, means non-wastage of economic resources. For example, if this country had attained and maintained the 1944 level of income in the thirties, it might have had one trillion dollars more of income than it actually had. One trillion dollars is arrived at as the difference between attainable income as indicated by the 1944 achievement and actual income in the thirties. The sum is an overestimate because it is probable that we would not have liked to work so hard in the thirties as we have had to work during the war; also, the output per man-hour was not so great, and the numbers on the labor market less. It is, however, significant because it indicates what might have been achieved at that time through a full-employment policy. Nor should we forget that full employmeant means high morale, and a large amount of unemployment, particularly if it is concentrated on the same people, means a breakdown of morale.

Second, is full employment an appropriate goal?

There are economists who say that it is not desirable to have full employment. They argue, for example, that it is necessary to have a reserve of a few million workers in order to have a well functioning labor market. Sir William Beveridge, on the other hand, contends that the ideal system is one in which there are more jobs than there are workers. This would, in his view, considerably strengthen the bargaining position of workers and make for improvement in the institutional set-up. A full-employment economy does not rule out a minimum number of unemployed. For example, Sir William pointed out that a minimum of three percent unemployed is to be expected in Great Britain. In this country it might well be that five-percent unemployment, *i. e.*, three million unemployed, is unavoidable. I can even envisage a situation in which five million unemployed would not be a serious matter —if we had an adequate social-security program and the unemployment were not concentrated on the same people. The difficulty, however, is that we may not stabilize at five million unemployed. A decline in employment results in reduced spending and income, and therefore brings about a further cumulative decline.

Third, what is full employment?

We should also be clear as to what we mean by full employment. If the American people want to work 40 hours a week and they are only allowed to work 30 hours a week, then they are three-quarters employed and one-quarter unemployed. Our recent experience of increased hours of work may suggest, for example, that American labor, prior to the war, was in fact unemployed in so far as it worked 37 hours before the war though it may have preferred to work 44 hours. It may also be that the unemployment in the thirties,

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which averaged nine millions, may actually have been greater than it seemed, since many would gladly have been on the labor market had there been a reasonable chance of getting a job. This is suggested by the addition of seven millions to the labor force during this war who ordinarily would not be there.

Fourth, let us consider the relation of the numbers on the labor market to unemployment.

One aspect of this problem is that the amount of employment and of unemployment will depend upon the numbers on the labor market and the hours of work. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what is the appropriate number of hours of work per week and whether we should encourage people to stay on the labor market or discourage them from it. For example, if we have a 35-hour instead of a 40-hour week, which is generally assumed, the reduction to 35 hours might make available some seven million more jobs, or reduce the amount of unemployment by seven million. This problem, however, requires further investigation, for the reduction of hours and income in turn reduces demand. In the years 1900-40 the number of hours a week in manufacturing dropped from 60 to 37, and it is conceivable that the public might continue to take part of its gains in increased leisure. It is also possible to encourage an additional five million people to continue their education for a longer period, and to this extent the numbers on the labor market and the amount of unemployment may be reduced. If that is what the American people want, it might be an excellent solution of the problem of unemployment. We must, however, be sure that it is what they want, because if they do not want this, then they are really suffering an undesired reduction in their standard of living. Even then this solution may be preferable to widespread unemployment: the incidence of unemployment might be evenly distributed and wastage of resources reduced. There are, however, better solutions.

Fifth, the government's responsibility.

The government should take some responsibility for employment. This is, however, a decision for the American people, not for economists. It is a political, rather than an economic, issue. Certainly the experience of the last few generations indicates that our system of private enterprise does not yield full employment. Sir William Beveridge has found that over several generations there have been large amounts of unemployment. Even at peaks, the amount of unemployment has been 10 percent or more of the numbers seeking work. In the United States in the thirties, our unemployment must have averaged 20 percent of the labor force; and if you allowed for those who would have preferred to be members of the labor market had jobs been available, the percentage might well have been greater.

Sixth, have the American people expressed themselves on this subject?

In the thirties, when there was a large amount of unemployment, the government reacted by introducing such programs as the FERA, the WPA, the PWA, etc. These were, however, inadequate to deal with the large amount of unemployment. In fact the government, through the introduction of social insurance, assumed that a certain amount of unemployment was inevitable. This insurance coverage has not been adequate nor have the benefits been large enough; and in periods of sustained unemployment the reserves of some states might quickly be wiped out. Under our present unemployment-insurance program, we may make the following assumptions for an early postwar year: 1. Unemployment—10 millions. 2. Benefits—$15 a week. (Roughly the present average.) 3. Duration—16 weeks. (Roughly the present average.) 4. Numbers eligible—one-half of 10 millions. 5. Cost—$1.2 billion, or about 20 percent of the total reserves. We may conclude, then, that given good distribution, the reserves of $6 billion are large enough to cover benefits for several years even with a large amount of unemployment. The loss of wages would, however, be about $20 billion per year on these assumptions and benefits would be only $1.2 billion, or six percent. We may conclude that our present unemployment insurance is at best a palliative.

Seventh, are the American people prepared to accept large amounts of unemployment?

It is particularly the war experience that raises doubts as to whether the American public will be content to accept large amounts of unemployment over long periods, as, to some extent, they did in the thirties. In this war we have increased the number of jobs, including military service, from 45 to 66 million, and there has been a considerable amount of upgrading. Compensation to employees is up from $48 to $116 billion. Even on very favorable assumptions as regards unemployment, most experts would estimate that as a result of a loss of $13 billion from reduced overtime—in addition to losses associated with downgrading, movement out of the labor market, etc.—wages and salaries will fall from $25-$30 billion. That will be a very difficult pill for labor to swallow. And will the American public be willing to accept, say, from five to 15 million unemployed? There have been 26 million people mobilized for war and for war industries, and these people must find jobs—frequently new jobs. The federal government will cut its expenditures by $75 billion. Alternative-spending methods must be found for a large part of that sum.

Furthermore, the distribution of workers and capital has changed considerably since 1939. The problem of unemployment is, therefore, not merely a question of providing adequate demand, but also one of ensuring the distribution of capital and labor in such a way that, given the total demand, employment may be maximized.

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Eighth, can private enterprise provide the jobs?

Many doubt it can. Certainly our experience of the last generation supports this position. Perhaps if we could establish a free competitive system, with price flexibility, free trade, absence of monopoly, flexible wages, complete mobility of capital and labor—a system we have never had—then an important contribution might be made to the maintenance of a high level of employment. Another condition, however, would be that the income earned in any period should be spent. This is the great contribution that Lord Keynes has made to our economic thinking. Keynesian economists argue that unless measures are taken to keep spending up to income earned in a given period, there will be unemployment, and this unemployment may spread cumulatively. If the workers and others earn $100 billion in any period and only spend $80 billion, then there will be a $20-billion reduction in demand, and those who suffer from this reduction will in turn cut their spending. Though business is making a valiant effort to bring us back to a state more nearly like the competitive system which Mr. Hayek and others talk about, but which has not existed for a long time, I very much doubt whether they will succeed. It is necessary then to take measures to assure an adequate level of spending.

It is clear that we must depend on government to some extent, and apparently to an increasing extent. Government tax collections in the United States have increased from $166 million, or 4 percent of the national income in 1860, to $937 million, or 7.3 percent in 1890, to $2,260 million, or 6.5 percent of our 1913 income, to $14.8 billion, or 22.7 percent in 1938, and roughly to $55 billion, or almost one-third of the national income, in 1945.

Ninth, what is the magnitude of the problem?

There is general agreement that consumption must rise by at least 50 percent above prewar levels; and, whereas net investment in the thirties was around zero, it must rise to around $25 billion in order to give us a full-employment economy. As incomes rise, the public tends to spend less, or at least tends to save more. Its elementary needs are soon satisfied. Therefore, it becomes necessary to find some other types of consumption. It is not easy to envisage what these new types of additional consumption will be. It is simple to say that at an income of $80 billion, the public consumes so much housing and so many automobiles, etc., and therefore at an income of $160 billion it will consume so many automobiles and so many houses. These estimates are obtained simply by extending curves which show the relationship between consumption and income at an earlier period. But unfortunately what the public does when it has an income of $60 or $70 billion tells us little about what it will do when it has an income of $160 billion, and projections on the basis of the past yield saturation of markets at an early point. Similarly, in the case of investment it is not easy to see how the public will be able to spend $25 billion productively on investment. A dollar of investment is very efficient today, and in view of the large amount of investment that has been made in the war period, the openings are not too numerous. We have approximately $20 billion worth of new plant, although some part of this addition will not be available for non-war purposes. Nevertheless, plants and equipment are available in large quantities and in modern form.

Tenth, the right to a job versus the right to profits and interest.

The struggle becomes one primarily of those who are inclined to overemphasize the protection of financial rights against those who argue that every American has a right to a job. Those who support the position of property owners argue that the country must not get into debt. Yet I am not sure they are not arguing against their own interests. If the government could succeed in providing a sustained period of full employment or a very high level of employment, both job-seekers and the owners of capital would be protected.

Geoffrey Crowther, the British economist, has estimated that this country should have a national income of $330 billion in the year 2000. This is not by any means an unreasonable estimate and assumes a less rapid rate of progress than we have made in the past. At this income we can stand a high level of public debt. At this level of income we shall have full employment and also easily meet our financial obligations. We must not forget that against the rise of public debt are to be put the income-earning assets that are provided through the expansion of debt, the rise of income and the corresponding rise of tax capacity. Are the propertied classes better protected with a national income of $60 or $160 billion?

We should not overlook the following aspects of the growth of public debt: (a) There will be periods of repayment, that is, periods of inflation or potential inflation, as well as periods of increasing public debt. (b) The creation of public debt is not necessarily inflationary. The debt would rise in periods of idle savings. These would be taken by the government and be used to put unemployed resources to work. Against the rise of active money there would be a rise of output, and, therefore, the net effect should not be inflationary. Moreover, if the net effect is an expansion of money, we are putting one possible danger which could be controlled—the danger of large supplies of money relative to the supply of goods—against the even greater danger that we encountered in the thirties, of inadequate supplies of purchasing power against the supply of goods available, which brings deflation and unemployment. (c) We should never forget that the burden of the debt is a function of, and is related to, the total

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amount of income. A $150-billion income can yield us $20 billion worth of federal taxes which will easily carry our present debt burden. If, on the other hand, we allow our income to fall to $100 billion, we shall need more than $20 billion worth of taxes to take care of our ordinary needs plus unemployment expenses and the like. A tax burden of $30 billion (federal, state and local) requires only 20 percent of the national income in the first case, and one of $35 billion (second case) requires 35 percent of the national income.

The Wagner-Murray full-employment bill, however appealing, is not perfect. It is based on the philosophy that adequate total demand and full employment are all that matters. But full employment is not only a question of adequate total demand. That the magnitude of demand is the most important single variable, we can be sure, however.

Another important factor is the distribution of capital and labor, both regionally and occupationally. We may have adequate total demand and yet have a considerable amount of unfilled vacancies and unemployment at the same time, the reason being that capital is in one place and labor is in another. This is a particularly important fact in view of the large distortions brought about both regionally and occupationally by the war. The rate of growth, for example, in some parts of the country (*e. g.*, California, Washington and some sections of the South) has been several times the rate of growth in the New England area or in New York or Pennsylvania. This is evidenced by the rise of employment, the increase of bank deposits, the rise of income payments and the like. Unless the government takes some responsibility for assuring the best possible distribution of capital and labor, large amounts of unemployment and reduced productivity will result.

We must not consider full employment to the exclusion of productivity. Latin America does not suffer greatly from unemployment, but its per-capita income is probably less than one-tenth of ours. Our task is not only to find jobs for all who want them, but also to make sure that abilities are used to a maximum degree.

Let us not be ungrateful, however. If Senator Wagner and his colleagues offer the prospect of three square meals a day, we should not cry because caviar and strawberries are not included.

SEYMOUR E. HARRIS

London Letter

Even the oldest delegate at Blackpool recognizes that this conference is one of the most dramatic in the forty-year history of the Labor Party. On Sunday night, May 20, party leader Clement Attlee, newly returned from San Francisco, read Churchill's letter to the National Committee. Churchill, hoping to split the Labor leadership, offered Labor two alternatives: either remain in the coalition to the end of the Japanese war, or proceed with an immediate election. Thereby the Prime Minister, advised by Beaverbrook and Bracken that the Tories must hold the election while their war-winning prestige is untarnished, rejected Labor's proposal for an autumn election.

The Labor Executive unanimously decided to accept the challenge. While pledging first priority to the Japanese war, the Executive was unable to agree to a further prolongation of the ten-year-old Parliament, branded as savoring of fascism a suggestion for a referendum, and declared that a coalition of Tories and Labor would be unable to tackle reconstruction of the war-damaged cities and industries of Britain. Nor did Labor on the grounds of national or party advantage favor an immediate election: the Electoral Register is defective, many servicemen are disfranchised, there is little opportunity to make the public aware of the issues. The conference endorsed the Executive decision.

Labor's answer went to Downing Street on Monday. On Tuesday back to Blackpool came Churchill's pained reply. On Wednesday Churchill resigned. On Friday the Labor conference ended after a week-long demonstration of unity in the resolve to win what one speaker called the most important election in the history of Britain. From the brilliant Morrison to the powerful Bevin, from Dalton to Bevan, Laski, Shinwell, Cripps and Wilkinson, every leader backed the Executive's published five-year plan.

The general opinion is that Churchill's action harmed the Tories. Servicemen are especially irritated. Already the non-party *Daily Mirror* has attacked Churchill for failing to honor his earlier declaration against rushed elections. A Wednesday *Mirror* cartoon showed an ex-soldier talking to his son: "What else did you do in the war, Daddy?" "I lost my vote."

But the final results will be decided by a choice of the people between the broad issues of constructive planning versus private enterprise. The Gallup Poll favors Labor. The Stock Exchange is seven-to-four on the Tories. The battle is now on.

Before Labor accepted the Tory challenge to an immediate election, there was a sharp exchange between Ernest Bevin and Churchill's aide, Minister of Information Brendan Bracken. Bevin blamed the Tories, in power for 19 out of 21 inter-war years, for losing the last peace. Bracken countered with the charge that before the war the Labor Party was a bunch of pacifists who prevented Britain from rearming. And then

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the lid was clamped down again. Tory and Labor speakers went back to the impersonal level, the one damning controls, the other extolling planning.

Both parties have suffered setbacks in recent by-elections. Motherwell, in the center of Scotland's industrial zone, had been a Labor seat, but was lost by a thousand votes to Dr. McIntyre of the Scottish Nationalist Party. Local Conservatives supported McIntyre; Labor put no guts into the fight; and the government has prevaricated about Prestwick as the Transatlantic Air Terminal and about the projected Forth Bridge. The truth is that Scotland has been Britain's No. 1 depressed area, and no party has declared for a sufficiently dynamic program of economic development. Of even more significance, the Conservatives lost Chelmsford to Common Wealth; a 16,000 Tory majority was turned into a 6,000 minority.

It is surprising that Labor's recently published election program should have aroused so little interest. Certainly there were no shocks in it. It pledged itself to the full nationalization of coal, electricity, gas, inland transport and iron and steel, and partial nationalization of the land; but this was to be expected. It thundered against the Tory drive for rapid decontrol, declaring this would mean inflation and a short, speculative postwar boom followed by a catastrophic crash; but this was now a familiar story. Labor must have a propaganda campaign at least as good as the PAC's if it is to stand up to the onslaught of the Tory press.

People still talk about Roosevelt. He probably meant more to the British than any of their own leaders since Queen Victoria and Gladstone. "I feel as though I had lost a dear friend," said a woman public-house-keeper, echoing the thoughts of millions. "My husband and my boy are all that I have," said an ex-serviceman's wife. "I want Colin to grow up in a world at peace. I feel that Mr. Roosevelt's death has to a large extent lessened the prospects of such a world." Or a taxi-driver: "The ideals for which Roosevelt worked and thought have taken too firm a hold on the world to be easily uprooted." Or a civil servant: "The pity of it is that he was the only liberal of the Yalta three." The tattered flags which were flying at half-mast over the bombed homes of the East End of London symbolized the sorrow of the nation. It was not only that we felt gratitude to Roosevelt for his help after the fall of France; he also seemed to be one of the few idealists among the world's leading politicians. We still crave idealism, and no one feels that it is much in evidence at San Francisco.

The ghastly stories from the horror camps of Buchenwald and Belsen continue to be good for headlines in Britain's papers. At their breakfast tables in Suburbia, mystified people read accounts of tortures, whippings, cremations and rapes. They see in the official report of the British Parliamentary Delegation that Frau Koch, wife of the Buchenwald commandant, collected articles made of human skin: "One of these pieces clearly formed part of a lampshade." A good many people react violently and blame the inveterate fiendish brutality of the German race. Even German refugees have been victimized. Workers in one factory petitioned against working with refugees. One grocer displayed a notice saying: "No member of the Herrenvolk will be served here." Other people point out that most of the prisoners were Germans, political opponents of the Nazis. A brilliant Low cartoon in the *Evening Standard* made this poignantly clear. The *News Chronicle* recapitulated its prewar exposures of Hitler's concentration camps, dating back to 1933. "To many," it said, "the facts were unpalatable; many people preferred to buy a newspaper which assured them that all was well." Would appeasement have been killed if there had been the same blaze of publicity in 1936?

At the same time a friend in the United States Army wrote me from Germany: "Sitting in the empty lounge of a huge luxury hotel on the Rhine. Around me are empty rooms where there had once been balls and extravagant dinners. A French boy in American uniform—one of four soldiers in the whole place—is playing the piano in the dark deserted ballroom. The main door swings open and a colonel walks through looking for something. He sees a British major having a silent meal, served by a Russian girl from Kharkov. 'Who's in charge here?' The captain is sorry, he's just moving through himself. The colonel shrugs, walks up the wide golden staircase and is seen no more. In the kitchen is a Belgian cook talking German to the German waiter. Another girl with long hair is singing in Russian. Two muddy drivers from an American outfit walk in. They ask for rooms. Someone says, 'Take them,' and they go upstairs to a suite. The Rhine looks peaceful, and white blossoms are blurred in the distant mist. This is the hotel where Hitler met Chamberlain during the 1938 crisis."

An officer just back from a Royal Navy post in Reykjavik tells me that the two-year-old new Republic of Iceland may soon have a Communist government. At the general election in 1942 the Communists obtained only 10 out of 52 seats in the Parliament, but since then their strength has been growing rapidly. Today the three most important foreign influences are the United States Army, which garrisons the island, the Royal Navy, which guards the sea approaches and represents Iceland's largest customer, and the Russian Legation, which is far and away the largest of the foreign missions. It is hardly surprising that most of Iceland's wartime guests are interested in her present and potential air fields.

London FLEET STREET

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Canada's Baby Bonus

CANADA's postwar social legislation starts functioning this summer when the first monthly payments will go out from Ottawa to all parents who have children under 16 years of age. Because too many of Canada's young men and women volunteering for the armed services were found to have suffered during the depression of the thirties and did not measure up to the physical standards required, the Canadian government last year legislated payments to parents to help them provide the essentials for raising their families.

Designed primarily to enable the low-income groups to give more nourishing food and adequate clothing to their children, the family-allowance payments are estimated to benefit 1,300,000 of the 1,500,000 families in Canada. It is estimated that the payments will cost the government about $250 million a year, *or the same amount as the dominion has been spending every two weeks on the war*. The payments will go to rich and poor alike, but those who pay income tax and are allowed deductions for children will not benefit twice. They must list their family-allowance payments as income.

Payments will be made for all children born in Canada and resident there. Children born outside Canada must have had at least three years' residence in the dominion before becoming eligible for payments, but children born to Canadians in the armed services who have married overseas and are now resident in Canada can qualify for monthly benefits.

Payments are to start in July, and most likely will be made to the mother. They will start at $5 a month for each child under 6 years of age, increase to $6 a month for children between 6 and 9 years old, to $7 a month for youngsters 10 to 12 years of age, and reach their maximum of $8 a month for boys and girls of 13 to 15 years of age. Where there are large families, payments are reduced $1 a month for the fifth child, $2 a month for the sixth and seventh child, and $3 a month for the eighth and additional children.

In a number of Canadian communities and rural districts it was found that children were staying home from school for lack of shoes or clothing or both. A stipulation of the eligibility of a child for the monthly payments is that if he or she is over six years of age, and is physically and mentally fit, the child must attend a school. On the questionnaire which went to all Canadian homes this spring, the listing of children who were of school age but did not attend school was requested.

While the $250 million which Ottawa estimates the plan will cost a year is but a small fraction of Canada's wartime budget of $6 billion, it is a sizable share of the peacetime budget of about $2 billion. Because the money will be spent at once on food, clothing, medical attention and other necessities for the children, an important factor is the postwar purchasing power which the plan provides.

The legislation provides for investigating cases where it is thought the money is not spent for the betterment of the children. Government officials, however, feel that few investigations will be necessary. They base their opinion on the fact that not many mothers of soldiers' children need to have their dependents' allowances looked after by welfare agencies, and that few investigations of relief food payments during the depression were required.

The family-allowance plan, or "baby bonus," has met with approval throughout Canada. Political opposition has developed in provincial conservative political quarters on a variety of grounds, including the usurpation of provincial rights and the fact that some provinces will contribute more in general taxation than they will benefit in family allowances. But the "baby bonus" was passed in Parliament at Ottawa with practically no opposition, with all parties agreeing. Canadian parents see a new deal for their children in the family-allowance plan.

JAMES MONTAGNES

Property owners fearing for their vested interests have been the oiled tow of fascist conflagration. How much oiled tow is lying around? That is the question we need to answer, if we wish to forecast the future of Nazism and fascism.

There will be very little tow left on the continent of Europe. The big fortunes of Germany are gone, nor is there a clear prospect that new fortunes can rise out of the rubble heaps of war. The big fortunes of France and Italy are sadly compromised with the beaten Nazi and Fascist governments. The demands of the masses for food, clothing and shelter will absorb about all the labor power that can be organized for production. . . .

If there is any oiled tow lying around to catch Nazi and fascist sparks, it must be in America. We have immense private interests that are prepared to defend themselves. But apart from journalistic propagandists and private crackpots, there is very little fear of the Reds in America. We have learned to value the Russians as allies and to admire the economic power they have deployed in the war—economic power far beyond our hopes. We are content to let them keep their peculiar communistic ideology, and we mean to keep our own democratic ideology, against which the Russians have no designs. It is a fair guess that in the coming decades Russia and America will find it possible to coöperate consistently for the peace without which no ideology has meaning.

Nazism and fascism will smolder through many years. But it is extremely unlikely that they will find the material for a great conflagration. – *Alvin Johnson in the* Bulletin *of the New School for Social Research.*

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Washington Notes

President Truman Goes into Action

DURING THE 1944 presidential race a reporter asked Governor Dewey how he felt about the Hull reciprocal trade agreements.

"You mean the Republican reciprocal-trade-agreements program which Secretary Hull has been carrying out," exclaimed the New Yorker, with his customary air of superiority. "That has always been a Republican policy, which Secretary Hull has carried out ably, and which I hope the Republicans will continue to carry out."

Last Saturday the House voted on the Doughton bill to extend the "Republican" reciprocal-trade-agreements program. The vote was 239 to 153. Republicans voted heavily against extension, 150 to 34 (including pairs), as they did in committee, where the 10 Republicans solidly opposed the measure. Once more the elected GOP members of Congress had repudiated their presidential candidate.

Despite die-hard GOP opposition, however, President Truman and the American people face the possibility this week of a double congressional victory on foreign affairs, and a repudiation of economic isolation which would encourage the whole world. In respect to the Bretton Woods ratification, I think the victory is practically won. After months of discusssion in which popular pressure has slowly but surely expressed itself, the House Banking and Currency Committee last week gave the program an overwhelming approval—23 to 3. This vote was so big that it practically assured quick House passage, with the expectation of Senate approval also. Much of the credit goes to the ranking minority member on the committee (who was a delegate at Bretton Woods), Jesse P. Wolcott. He played a waiting game, carefully masked his ultimate intentions, and finally brought all but three Republicans along with him into camp, with only minor reservations. Never was there a better illustration of the wisdom of including congressmen in bipartisan international gatherings.

The fight over the trade-agreement program is much more difficult. Whether it can squeak through the Senate is doubtful. Dewey, Willkie, Landon, and now Governor Stassen, potential 1948 Republican standard-bearer, have all approved the general program. But the attitudes of a political party are not expressed in the appeals of its presidential candidates but in the everyday votes of its elected representatives. And in the Senate as in the House the GOP is still largely the unregenerate apostle of Smoot-Hawleyism, and the protection of special, as against national, interest.

The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill to extend social security to 15 million additional persons, substitute federal for present state unemployment-compensation systems and establish a national health-insurance system is social legislation in the great New Deal tradition. It will be interesting to see what President Truman does on this bill. It is my understanding that within the next week or so he will send a message to Congress strongly supporting a wider social-security base. But will he resort to generalities, or will he give his active and specific support to this particular bill? In other words, has the time come for the political honeymoon to end, and for Mr. Truman to declare himself, ideologically, the leader of Roosevelt liberalism?

It will be good to see him support the Wagner bill immediately, though I can understand why he might still want to wait a little longer, particularly with foreign affairs at their present crisis. For six weeks Mr. Truman has played a cautious and, I think, a remarkably competent game. His political position is not really difficult to understand. The Democratic team is composed of two horses, mutually antagonistic, and any successful party leader must ride them both. Mr. Roosevelt did this, and if Mr. Truman wants reëlection he must do the same thing. The bigger and more important of these horses represents the liberal-labor group. Mr. Truman is not apt to go "conservative," as some hopeful columnists have predicted, for two reasons: first, his own record is liberal; second, because it would be simple political suicide to throw away the New Deal-labor support.

The cabinet shuffle that substitutes Schwellenbach for Miss Perkins, Anderson for Wickard and Clark for Biddle fits neatly into the unfolding Truman program. When President Roosevelt died, I wrote that his cabinet was one of the weakest in history, and forecast that Mr. Truman would change half the members within six months. Actually, he has changed four of them in six weeks. Strong Presidents have weak cabinets, and in Mr. Roosevelt's case he had also extemporized a system of temporary super-cabinets.

The Truman appointments strengthen the cabinet both as to membership and as an institution. They give wider recognition to the West (something that Governor Dewey promised to do if elected in the last campaign) and put in men who, on the average, are 10 years younger than their predecessors. Mr. Truman also shows an intention of reabsorbing big war agencies, like the War Food Administration, back into the appropriate cabinet offices. That is why Representative Anderson will take over both Mr. Wickard's job, as Secretary of Agriculture, and Judge Marvin Jones's job as War Food Administrator. This, coupled with his message to Congress on federal reorganization, shows a desire to give a more efficient departmentalized government. Of course the fact is that most recent Presidents have also asked Congress for reorganization power, and Congress has generally balked.

I have always liked Judge Schwellenbach, to whom goes the tough job of Secretary of Labor. I have watched Representative Anderson in one or two of his House investigations. He isn't much at cross-examination and a lot of the best questions he put were passed up to him from the reporters' table. But he is diligent and has the happy political faculty, like Truman's, of persuading his committee to go along. I don't know much about Tom Clark, named to succeed Biddle as Attorney General. He is the big question-mark of the group. He succeeds a man who, although he has plenty of critics, has left a record for protecting civil liberties in this war which should give pride to all Americans.

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Notes. – As Mr. Churchill indicated, the British election is not likely to prevent or delay a Big Three meeting; on the contrary he will make political capital by attending such a parley. . . . Truman's first meeting as President with Philip Murray, CIO head, came last week when Murray presented labor's case for a 20-percent wage increase; as war orders slacken and overtime declines, this issue will grow. The prospect is for a compromise increase of 10 percent, say, accompanied by price-control relaxations that will pretty much cancel out the effect of the increase. . . . Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, in charge of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany, has so many uniformed ex-industrialists interested in German cartels on his staff that they are known as "Dillon, Read generals"—in fact, Brigadier General William H. Draper, one of his staff, left that unwarlike institution in 1940. . . . War-profits note: The latest SEC report shows that the total net working capital of all United States corporations jumped from $24.6 billion in 1939 to $45.5 in 1944; current assets jumped from $54.6 to $98 billion.

Washington T. R. B.

Martha Graham

I SOMETIMES THINK that the better a work of art is, the less adequate can any writing about it ever be. The more completely the content or idea is expressed in terms of the art involved, the more truly might we say that in that art alone can it be expressed. In a painting, a sonata, a dance, for example, the medium employed in each case is not that of words. We will stick to the dance. In so far as the content of a dance of Miss Graham's can be expressed in words, it might be said that this content has not been wholly and purely converted into the dance medium, and has not found there its own inescapable body to contain it.

This would seem to make all criticism valueless, which is true of much of it but obviously not true of all. There is criticism in the creative direction, where the critic tries to create in the word-medium something that suggests or parallels what is created in that other medium, the dance. Or the critic may supply useful information about the work of art in dance form, certain facts with regard to it, or to its sources and origins, or may provide indications and perceptions as to the artist's intentions, which so often are not completely fulfilled. Or the critical writer may serve largely as a reporter, a conveyer of news as to what happened on the occasion reported. This is the reviewing profession at its easiest angle, and often its safest and most satisfactory. The sad part of the whole business of reviewing performances—and books—is this: that in a democracy like ours the ass is all too soon as good as the rider (as they said in Athens centuries ago); where everybody is equal, the ideas of all are likely to be held equal. Allowing for the Platonic exaggeration of that sentence, we may say that we have much too much writing where brief minor reporting would serve in the case of book after book, play after play, et cetera, et cetera. A foreigner innocently reading the Sunday papers and reviews could scarcely find out what was distinguished and what not worth a second thought, since most of the general tone is the same and is equally shameless as business and discouraging as ethical character in the approach to art.

As to Martha Graham the only thing I hold against her art is that every time I see one of her programs I am beset all over again with the above considerations and am rendered hopeless as to any ability of mine to convey in these pages the occasion. I can pay her no higher compliment.

If this were a daily sheet and I were writing next morning, I could report as best I might what happened at the National Theatre on the opening night of Miss Graham's week—May 14 to 20—of performances, not failing to mention the large theatre packed to the last standee allowed. But that makes no sense in a journal that appears days after that week is over and for a public that for the most part would have no chance to view the performances at the National. If Miss Graham were a new artist, her method might be described, in so far as it does not defy description—I should say it largely does, though it is marvelously complete in these later exhibitions. But she has long been one of the known and established artists in our theatre. I can at least report that there are two major new offerings, both based on compositions that were commissioned for the Library of Congress music festivals last October. "Appalachian Spring," on which Mr. Aaron Copland was lately awarded the Pulitzer Prize for music, was one. The other is "Herodiade" (Miss Graham's title was "Mirror Before Me," but the original title of the music has been substituted), based on Paul Hindemith's composition. In this connection it should be said that Miss Graham has mastered the most extraordinary sense of relation to the music and the music's relation to the dance composition. In the safer field of conventional ballet this relation between ballet and music is by no means easy or very often perfect, but it is all more tangible as a problem and a method. In Miss Graham's fresh field of dance composition this problem is a stiffer business, and her profound and lyric solution of it in these new pieces is unforgettable.

The week's program also includes a new piece, "John Brown," with Erick Hawkins, and "Mysterious Adventure," with Merce Cunningham. Mr. Hawkins is given spoken words, drawn from the writings and speeches of John Brown and his epoch, and a character who does not dance, called the Interlocutor, is played by Mr. Will Hare. The entire company reflects Miss Graham's integrity and laborious technical training. Nobody is bad, and the tone of the whole scene of these performers is right and is securely placed. Mr. Merce Cunningham is a dancer with a curious Gothic quality and an expert approach; and the milieu surrounding him here in this Graham company is what will carry him farthest as a dancer in any true sense—we can only hope that in the confusions of Broadway he knows this. Mr. Erick Hawkins grows steadily; his is an art beginning with character and manliness, a deep, ascetic, rigorous fineness of understanding and a constant search for what is clean and final. He is the kind of artist who with the wrong surroundings and the wrong method would have been nothing at all. As it is, he has, and has been given, a knowledge of the form, the consecration and the dream that are rightly related to his capacity.

Of Martha Graham there are mostly the familiar—not familiar enough—things to say. There is a sense of stage projection, based on intensity and absorption and strict elimination of the unessential, that is rarely found anywhere in the theatre. (Charlie Chaplin has it.) There is the per-

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sonal and long channeled magnetism. There is the almost startling photogenic, as they say, possibility that she enjoys, by which her stage images are so varied and so underscored. Certainly the human heart at times must be the marvel of the angels, and from this artist there comes through something whose recognition by a large public is to their unbounded credit. There remains what to a painter's eye, notably modern painters in the best sense, is perhaps an ultimate quality, and that is the drawing, what we might call the drawing in these compositions, and very markedly evident in the new "Appalachian Spring." We cannot go into a definition of that term here. It is understood only by genius, study or long experience with art. But taking them as a partial illustration of what I mean, I may say that the scenes in "Appalachian Spring" between the lovers, Mr. Hawkins and Miss Graham, held in static and memorable stillness, while the narrative action otherwise goes on, have great drawing, a concentration within the mass density and outline that in itself suggests a certain, as it were, Giottoesque modern. In this regard these compositions offer the most creative, as well as the ultimate, most strict and most nobly designed, manifestations of our theatre today.

STARK YOUNG

Signs of the Double-Cross

THE ADVERTISING around the entrance to a Broadway movie theatre seems designed to catch the eye of a nearly blind person walking several blocks away, to satisfy bargain-conscious movie fans, to appeal to the mind and wishes of a delinquent, and it is to be trusted as little as you can manage. The signs over the marquees are usually four or more stories high and sometimes as wide as the Gotham's, which extends over the theatre and beyond, to cover stores for jazz records, fruit drinks, magic supplies, men's clothing and cigars. Some of the houses carry two or three of these signs. This advertising creates the illusion that the movie will keep you in an unending state of the most violent emotion, that the show won't have one slow scene and that you won't see a better picture anywhere, any time. The statements of critics who liked the movie or whose reviews can be edited to show liking are generally presented on painted images of gun blasts, or the theatre owner thinks up his own exclamatory sentence. The aim, like a sideshow barker's, is to hold your attention while keeping you from using your own judgment.

The main subjects for exploitation are sex, murder and actors, but it seems that something can also be got out of technicolor, the acclaim of critics and columnists, large quantities of cataclysmic events and the number of weeks the movie has run. There are occasional exceptions, but in general the film's idea is never exploited, and a director or writer only if he had something to do with making "Going My Way" or is as famous as Pearl Buck. As far as I could see last week, the movies that contained moral love affairs and moral people were exploited for having just the opposite; if there was little or no sex, it was suggested that there was lots; details in the posters, such as guns, the fright or cruelty in a character's eyes, the hands of a strangler, the texture and highlights of a dress, were done with the greatest care and emphasis; actors were generally seen in an embrace, or about to kill or be killed. The most popular words were "thrill," "shock" and "suspense." The billboards had exploding, eerie or hallucinatory effects.

Just the deceit practised in these signs is breathtaking. The following are some theatre-front displays within three blocks on Broadway. Underneath the marquee at the Criterion, as an advertisement of "Counter-Attack," is a large shot of the heroine in black negligee, leaf-patterned brassière and pants, chained to a dungeon wall. Nearby she is seen in the costume of a circus bareback rider, lying comfortably on a white satin divan, guarded by a Nazi with a bayonet. This illustrates "The suspense-filled drama of one woman and eight men trapped underground," though the movie is actually without sex, the heroine is never seen in less than the full outfit of a Partisan, and the movie shows how she and Paul Muni guard six Nazis. Two huge billboards over the Astor Theatre are combined to suggest the plot of "The Enchanted Cottage." In the top one is a message that the whole town whispered about these two. The message is enclosed in the kind of balloon used in comic strips for dialogue; the tail of the balloon drips down to the sign below and points to the kiss shown there between Dorothy McGuire, whose head is pillowed on pale clouds, and Robert Young, whose head is shown against a touch of orange sunset. Both seem to be asleep. The kiss is actually in the movie, but there is no whispering or anything irregular enough to be whispered about. The scene that is reproduced in seven or eight places around the Gotham Theatre, advertising "Colonel Blimp," shows the blonde an aged Tory is thought to dream of, a duel, and explanations like "a fighting fool about women," "a lusty lifetime of love and adventure." In the film there is no lust, no fighting over women, no blonde, no fighting fool, and the Colonel's movie lifetime is extremely quiet. The rest of Broadway seems to be covered with posters of people with guns and people running from them or from some nameless horror. It seems to me that even a hopeless delinquent would have a sense of degradation while buying his ticket under these signs.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

Thurtle [Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information] said that while the BBC had proved during the war that telling the truth could be more effective than calculated lying, it still was too early to give any definite statement on the future of foreign broadcasts. – *AP dispatch from London.*

After Laval escaped from Germany to Spain early in May, the French government asked Madrid to deliver him, alive and kicking, at the French frontier. Franco said no. He considers Laval to be a political offender rather than an ordinary criminal. . . . Perhaps he fears that by giving Laval to the French, he may be establishing a precedent. – *Frederick Kuh in* PM.

Reserving their venom for the captive Russians and Jews here, the Germans apparently treated their only occupied British territory [Guernsey] with unaccustomed mildness. The mass grave of a thousand Russians and Jews reportedly exterminated on the island of Alderney was being examined today by a criminal investigation officer. – *Cable to the New York* Times.

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That All-Out Effort

He [Senator Wiley] stated the American people had been fed "bunkum" concerning the San Francisco Conference, and that they had been led to believe more could come from it than was possible. . . . Senator Wiley said very forcefully he felt international music could do more for spiritual values and international peace than anything else. – *From the Milwaukee* Journal.

Among My Souvenirs

Hand grenades will make either book-ends or paper weights. Paint and decorate them either with fancy designs or paste on some little flowers from the old seed catalogue. – *From the* Ohio Farmer.

Much Too Good for Them?

Another explanation [of the banning in Germany of American, British and French magazines and newspapers] from an informed person outside the OWI is that the OWI's propagandists feel that the freedom of expression permitted in American publications, including criticism of the government, would not give the Germans the picture of democracy which is desired for them. – *From the Albuquerque* Tribune.

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of the New Republic. *Please enclose the original clipping.* – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Civil Liberties, Cont'd

SIR: I could not have confused, hopelessly or otherwise, the two matters you accuse me of confusing (in your comment of April 30), since I was not discussing either of them. The point is still civil liberties. I was discussing only Mr. Trowbridge's assertion that the nine instances he cited constituted violations of civil liberties. That is quite a different matter.

If Mr. Trowbridge's instances are violations of civil liberties, then they must be violations of the Bill of Rights or of laws consonant with the Bill of Rights. Neither Mr. Trowbridge nor you have published a line to show that the instances cited were such violations. Showing that the actions of the Catholics mentioned in the nine instances were "wrong," on their merits, from the point of view of democracy, economics, theology, sociology or health, is wholly irrelevant. I have not written a line in defense of any of these actions *per se*. Both in the article which you declined to print and in the letter which you printed on April 30, I stated this explicitly.

Of course I would defend (as would anyone who understands and upholds civil liberties) the right under our doctrine of civil liberties of a Protestant hospital to disbar Catholic doctors and their patients—and entirely without regard to what the doctors would do or refuse to do. As in the case of the Catholic hospitals, the question of public funds for such hospitals would be up to the legislature, and should be settled on the grounds of public service, not civil liberties. Any consequent "undemocratic procedures and harmful social results," even if completely proved or admitted, would constitute no proof of a violation of civil liberties.

If, as you say, "there was not the slightest suggestion in Mr. Trowbridge's article that the civil liberties of Catholics should be restricted," what was he suggesting? He said his instances *were violations of civil liberties*. Doesn't he believe in stopping violations of civil liberties? If not, what? It all adds up to this: Mr. Trowbridge does not want to interfere with the civil liberties of Catholics, so he just denies that the civil liberties of Catholics are "civil liberties." Simple, isn't it? It is also the universal pattern. Almost every major violation of civil liberties in the United States is perpetrated by someone dripping with devotion to the Constitution of the United States and the sacred Bill of Rights.

I am happy to have Mr. Trowbridge argue against the Massachusetts and Connecticut laws, as I did in my article of December 11. But when our arguments do not prevail, we should not call our opponents violators of civil liberties. Maybe they are just better advocates, or the legislators are too dull to agree with us. Anyway the Bill of Rights releases anyone from the necessity of agreeing with either of us. But neither of us can very well be released from the obligation of believing that the free citizens of these states have a right to such laws if they want them, until the Supreme Court says that these laws violate the Constitution.

When a case is being discussed, as in a committee of the American Civil Liberties Union, to determine whether or not there has been a violation of civil liberties, there should never be any consideration of approval or disapproval of the objectives sought by the parties to the case. If the Civil Liberties Union first decided to approve the purposes of one of the parties to a case (Catholics, Communists, Planned Parenthood Federation, Jehovah's Witnesses, WCTU, NAM) and then offered its services to the side whose objectives were approved, it would cease to be a "civil-liberties" organization and become simply a journeyman pressure group on the look-out for clients.

Civil liberties can be violated, and have been violated, in the name of morality, patriotism, democracy, religion and peace. These are all objectives to which I subscribe. But I am opposed to the violation of civil liberties in the support of any of them (except under wartime necessity). I am equally opposed to charging the advocates of immorality, disloyalty, dictatorship, atheism or war with *violating civil liberties* unless their actions do violate civil liberties. The protection of civil liberties is the most important peacetime function of government and the chief justification of war. All men (including you and Mr. Trowbridge) who believe in what our country has meant and can mean to its citizens and to humanity ought to understand and support civil liberties, over and above, in spite of, and even contrary to, belief in and support of any other social objective whatever. Only as we can universalize the observance of civil liberties expressed in the Bill of Rights, and often grossly subverted throughout the country, can we achieve what should be "the American way of life."

Wherever and whenever we have the reality of civil liberties, any man is free, *so long as he obeys the laws*, to support what he likes, to oppose what he likes, to believe what he likes, regardless of whether his activity is approved by the Catholic Church, or the Baptist Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, the *New Republic*, the *Daily Worker* or the New York *Times*. Who thinks he is right, and who thinks he is wrong, *never* has any legitimate bearing on the question of civil liberties. The right to be wrong is what civil liberties mean.

Brooklyn, N. Y. J. M. O'NEILL

[Mr. O'Neill's letter seems to us to add nothing to his communication, "Birth Control and Civil Liberties," published in our issue of April 30. We made a full reply at that time to his arguments. Mr. O'Neill has now had more than 5,100 words of space in the *New Republic* for the presentation of his case, in-

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cluding his article on December 11, 1944, his communication on April 30, 1945, and the present letter. This correspondence is therefore closed. – THE EDITORS]

To Ensure Full Employment

SIR: More than any other group in the community, Negroes are vitally interested in preventing postwar unemployment. They are the first fired and the last hired, so that if there is 10 percent of unemployment among the general population, there is 20 percent of unemployment among Negroes. Our organization, together with the CIO and other progressive groups, is working for a permanent Fair Employment Practice Committee to stop that. Another way to prevent the racial tension and even race riots which will be the probable result of postwar unemployment is to prevent unemployment itself.

The full-employment bill, S., 380, introduced by Senators Murray of Montana, Wagner of New York, O'Mahoney of Wyoming and Thomas of Utah, aims to do just that. The bill seeks to assure adequate total expenditures by private persons for consumption, by business for investment, and by various governmental bodies, to give useful jobs at decent pay to all able and willing to work. It would leave private industry as the first line of defense against unemployment and encourage investment by private business. But we must recognize that free enterprise without government planning never gave us full employment in peacetime. On the contrary, every eight or ten years it has plunged us into a severe depression with widespread unemployment, which culminated in our worst and longest depression, which began in 1930 under Herbert Hoover's presidency.

It is only common sense, therefore, to make the government the second line of defense against unemployment, ready with plans and useful projects to provide jobs for those to whom private industry fails to give employment.

That is the purpose of the full-employment bill, and it deserves the support of all forward-looking citizens.

CONSUELO C. YOUNG, Director of Publicity and Promotion,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
New York City

United Europe and Utopia

SIR: I wish to thank Richard N. Kelly for a courteous and sympathetic review of *Europe Free and United* [April 23]. But he is manifestly afraid of Utopia. Evidently he thinks that any plan ignored or frowned upon by the Big Three must be unrealistic, utopian or, worst of all, professorial. I never had any great faith in the infallibility of the triple-headed Sphinx. The mess it made of things at Yalta rather deepens my skepticism. If this be realism, give me anything else.

To borrow Mr. Kelly's railroad simile, Hitler wrecked the line, and I want to put the train back on the track. The Locarno spirit led Briand to a formal proposal for European federation. That was the way of sanity in 1929. It still is.

I should like to ask Mr. Kelly—and your readers—whether the following propositions are Utopian or realistic:

1. We cannot simply declare that Germany has ceased to exist. There are still from 70 to 80 million Germans in the center of Europe. The continent will have to unite in order to watch the Germans, to prevent their rearming, to gear their industry to the general interests of Europe. Non-Germans and Germans are thus forced into the closest partnership. On unequal terms until the German mind is reconstructed; but with liberty and equality as the goal.

2. Wendell Willkie and innumerable others have stated that a European Zollverein (Customs Union) is a necessity. But there can be no economic union without a common social policy, and therefore without a government.

3. Roosevelt, Churchill, Hoover—and Admiral Doenitz—realists all, of different stripes, agree about the existence of a "European family," now disrupted, and the need of a "European Council." "In the dim tomorrow," say the wise. Why? Shall we painfully rebuild the spite fences, Chinese walls and Maginot Lines of yesterday, now shattered, in the vague hope that we may pull them down later on?

Stanford University, Calif. ALBERT GUÉRARD

From The New Republic Mail Bag

We have received several letters commenting on Potomacus' article, "Low-Down on Meat," in our May 7 issue.

Mr. Wilbur LaRoe Jr., of the National Independent Meat Packers' Association, Washington, D. C., writes:

The article . . . misses the main point in issue. Under OPA regulations both beef and pork are being slaughtered at heavy losses. Using pork as an illustration, the OPA based its pork prices on the then live-hog prices of $13.75 per hundredweight. But they later authorized a ceiling price of $14.75 on live hogs and the prices have been bumping that ceiling for a long time. This converted profits into heavy losses. On beef the losses range up to $10 a head.

As a result of this condition the small, independent meat packers face a crisis. Some of them are selling out to chain stores or to big packers. The independents would be ruined were it not that the government, including the OPA, recognizes that relief in some form is urgently necessary. If their careful studies indicate that substantial relief is necessary, why should Potomacus, in an article which does not even discuss costs or losses, conclude that those who are trying to save the independent meat packers are villains?

Mr. Norman Draper, of the American Meat Institute, Chicago, Illinois, says that, "Far from attacking price control, no other group in this country has rendered a greater service to the cause of price control and rationing than the established meat packers." He continues:

The industry for months has been operating under severe losses . . . because wholesale ceiling prices have not been sufficient to reflect the prices paid for livestock. . . . The OPA has taken the position that profits should be figured on an over-all basis and not on individual classes of livestock and products therefrom. It should be remembered that a relatively large number of packers do not have an over-all business, but merely operate only in beef or in pork, or both. This means that the OPA's present attitude would force a substantial number of medium-sized and smaller companies, which do not have a diversified business, completely out of business. We think they have a right to live.

C. W. Eaton, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, calls our attention to an error on page 640 of Potomacus' article. The forecast of 1945 meat requirements for the armed services and other government agencies, including Lend-Lease, should have been 5,490 million pounds.

Mr. Benjamin Kirson, of Holicong, Pennsylvania, writes to us about the difficulties which confronted the farmer "less than two years ago" when "the surplus of hogs was large enough to constitute a major problem":

Really to understand the reason for the meat shortage, you have to imagine yourself with a dozen, fifty or a hundred hogs on your hands, just right for market. You know they are worth 14.5 cents a pound. The government says so. In fact the government promised to supply a buyer for them at that price. But the government won't buy them and no one else will, because no one else knows any more than you do what to do with them. . . . If you have taken the trouble to put yourself in such a farmer's place, you should have little trouble understanding why he sold most of his breeding stock and why he is very, very slow about increasing production again.

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Books in Review

Ex-Communist Manifesto

A SPECTRE is haunting Europe." . . . In 1849 Marx and Engels used this phrase to announce the appearance of a lusty child; Arthur Koestler in his recent collection of essays[1] employs it to describe what for him is in reality a ghost:

> The Left is an infant which was at first fed on the breasts of patriotism and later on the Russian bottle. The British Labor Party never grew out of the first stage, as her toothless leaders so touchingly demonstrate. The communists became addicted to the bottle and the evil smell of their diapers bears witness to the indigestibility of its contents. It is a painful metaphor, but who, looking at Europe a century after the birth of the Communist Manifesto, can deny its truth?

This passage is typical of much of the writing in *The Yogi and the Commissar*, with its striking if sometimes slapdash metaphors and sweeping generalizations, its spleen, its ultramontane leftism (when that serves his purpose—elsewhere he can speak apologetically of "traditional Britain" and the Blimp mind) and its rhetorical questions.

Of these elements, the metaphor and generalization are most actively at work in the two essays that give the book its title. Drawing heavily on the conceptions and nomenclature of science and philosophy, he arrives at the not very striking conclusion that at the ends of the social spectrum are the Yogi, who "believes that nothing can be improved by exterior organization and everything by the individual effort from within," and the Commissar, who "believes that all the pests of humanity, including constipation and the Oedipus complex, can and will be cured by Revolution, that is, by a radical reorganization of the system of production and distribution of goods; that this end justifies the use of all means, including violence, ruse, treachery and poison. . . ." What is needed, of course, to avoid the destructive tendencies of these polarities is a synthesis of the two, Koestler says, but he modestly stops short of more than hinting at how it is to be achieved.

His spleen, which may be the result of a style that was early attuned to Marxist polemics and has passed through the alembic of disillusionment in radical experience, operates most virulently in "The French 'Flu," an attack on Gide, Aragon and the author of *The Silence of the Sea*. His remarks about Gide fall well within the realm of difference of literary opinion, but leaving Aragon's poetry and politics aside, Koestler's insinuations as to Aragon's military role are in his own phrase "very nasty indeed" in view of the poet's record in the Resistance. If Koestler was not aware of it when he wrote the essay in November, 1943, he has had ample time to make amends since. And his "bet" that the then still unrevealed author of *The Silence of the Sea* would "turn out to be a French Fascist or at least a stanch reactionary," has been lost, a fact that Koestler or his publisher might have noted.

A third quality which runs through most of the essays—and which dominates the hundred pages devoted to an onslaught against the Soviet Union—is an immaculate conception of socialism in theory and practice. The three essays that comprise this section of the book form a brilliant lawyer's brief drawn almost entirely from evidence freely submitted by the accused—Soviet news accounts, state papers, laws, etc.—as one-sided as a prosecutor's summation. If the jury has not heard an equally brilliant defense, the verdict must be that Stalin's Russia has betrayed humanity "in the name of socialism for the Orthodox church, for Panslavism, Red millionaires, and the glorified traditions of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great." The evidence that Koestler produces is irrefutable testimony that politically, economically, and above all culturally, the USSR, if it has not, as he claims, "moved not toward but away from socialism," is far from the communism envisioned by Marx, Lenin and Koestler.

One could go on cataloguing the elements that have gone into these essays and discussing in detail other of the pieces —"Knights in Rusty Armor," "The Intelligentsia" and the memorial to Richard Hillary created considerable discussion upon their appearance in various periodicals—but they would seem to be best considered en masse as the meanderings, exhortations and explorations (the tags are Koestler's) of an ex-Communist who has remained within the orbit of the Left. His revulsion to latter-day communism has not carried him to the extreme of Trotskyism, the comfort of the status quo or the refuge of Yogi contemplation. He describes himself at one point as still a "homeless Leftist." His reflections carry back to an attempt to explain what went wrong, and the burden of his conclusion is that the Left "got into the blind alley because [it] fought capitalism in its own terms of reference, and [was] unable to ascend to that spiritual climate the longing for which we feel in our bones." Looking to the future: "The weaning of the Left, the breaking up of the false emotional compounds [chauvinism, mysticism, addiction to new myths], is one half of the task. The other half is the creation of a new fraternity in a new spiritual climate, whose leaders are tied by a vow of poverty to share the life of the masses, and debarred by the laws of fraternity from attaining unchecked power. If this seems utopian, then socialism is a utopia."

For the present: perhaps the formulation of Koestler that has attracted most attention is one which might be called the Theory of the Interregnum with its Corollary of Oases. This is elaborated on in "The Fraternity of Pessimists" which appeared originally in the New York *Times Magazine*, November, 1943. Even at that time, according to Koestler, it was clear that the postwar world was to be without any immediate prospect of fundamental change. The defensive, nationalistic character of the war has determined that. For the Left, "the interregnum of the next decades will be a time of distress and of gnashing of teeth. We shall live in the hollow of the historical wave."

Since no immediate radical solutions will be possible in this interregnum (I am still trying to paraphrase Koestler),

[1] The Yogi and the Commissar, by Arthur Koestler. New York: The Macmillan Company. 247 pages. $2.75.

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socialists, although they will watch for signs and portents of "the new movement [that] will reëstablish the disturbed balance between rational and spiritual values," will hold as their chief aim the creation of "oases in the interregnum desert." Like the monasteries of the Middle Ages and the universities of later eras, "oases" of like-minded Leftists will keep alive freedom, tolerance and humaneness in "the coming world of bellicose managerial giant-states. . . . In 1917 Utopia seemed at hand. Today it is postponed for the duration of the interregnum. Let us build oases. . . ."

I have attempted such a lengthy exposition of *The Yogi and the Commissar* for the simple reason that I fear that it is a book that will have few readers, or that few of the people who should read it will read it. Reactionaries will naturally revel in it; the non-political and the weary will attempt to use its formulations to justify their quietism and defeatism; but many radicals and liberals who are still serious about political action have been frightened or slightly nauseated by partial exposure to Koestler and are quite likely to sit this one out.

Although Koestler, as I have probably suggested, raises more problems than he settles—indeed it is doubtful if he settles anything—he does bring momentarily into focus the questions which the Left, both parties and individuals, must face and answer if the world, including the Soviet Union, is not again to be swept into total war or faced with the equally terrifying prospect of social stasis. Koestler sees that only a truly socialist movement—democratic and humanist—can answer capitalist imperialism on the one hand and what he likes to call Eastern Byzantinism on the other. His book would have been more valid historically and ethically more just if he had emphasized that the failure of Western Europe and America to produce such a movement is the clue to almost everything that has happened in Russia since 1917. It may well be that the world that arises from the ashes and graves and profits of this war will be similarly determined.

GEORGE MAYBERRY

Impious Fraud

A. Woollcott: His Life and His World, by Samuel Hopkins Adams. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock. 386 pages. $3.50.

IN ITS WAY, the period during which Alexander Woollcott was a drama critic was a sort of golden age of the American theatre. It was a day when the stage was bursting with vitality, excitement and promise, when great new reputations were beginning to be made in playwriting, acting, scene-designing and production, and the future seemed a mighty one. O'Neill was coming into his fame as a world dramatist, John Barrymore's *Hamlet* was showing us what acting could really be, the Theatre Guild was a harbinger of things to come, and no young newspaperman had a soul so dead that he did not dream of becoming a critic of the theatre. There were giants in those days, and Alexander Woollcott was one of the most towering of them.

Looking back at him now, just a little more than two years after his death, it might seem a trifle difficult to tell just why. Nothing that he wrote shows any sign of survival value. His prose, while graceful and effective, is recalled chiefly for its shameless coyness. Although he was drama critic in a significant period in American dramatic history, he exerted no influence in shaping dramatic standards. Certainly he never managed to put the stamp of his own critical ideas on the theatre in anything like the fashion achieved by his old antagonist, George Jean Nathan. His enthusiasms were notoriously unreliable and his cavalier attitude toward the growing powers of O'Neill was amazingly petty.

Even as a personality there might seem reason to question him. There was an incredible shallowness and smallness about him. His notorious rudeness was more frequently directed against people in no position to defend themselves than against those who could fight back. He was both a tyrant and a bully, and his gift for showmanship frequently degenerated into pretty cheap exhibitionism. While he seemed chiefly interested in giving a performance, he was one of the worst actors imaginable when he got on a stage. He is more likely to be remembered for the play about him than for anything he wrote or did.

In his biography, *A. Woollcott: His Life and His World*, Samuel Hopkins Adams makes no attempt to conceal the defects of his hero in any of his innumerable fields of endeavor. In fact, although the work is friendly, there are times when it appears that Mr. Adams finds relish in pointing out the multitudinous frailties of the critic and actor. In the end, though, it is clear that, both as a friend and a sound biographer, the author was wise in his method of approach. The faults in Alexander Woollcott were so obvious and so insistent that it would be blindness to conceal them. In addition, his corresponding virtues were so numerous and they are so clearly complements to his defects that any believable picture of the man must be frank about both sides of him.

What, then, were the qualities that made Woollcott important in his own time and interesting even today, despite his weaknesses as a writer and critic and his boorishness as a man? Chiefly it was his vitality and his ability to impart his enthusiasms to those who read him. His standards might be dubious and his admirations questionable, but he did, beyond the capacity of anyone else who did or does write about the theatre, possess the power to make a reader feel that he must drop everything and rush off to see the play or the performmance being gushed over. Even when you later came to question the justification for the praise, there was always the likelihood that the next time he began dancing in the streets, you would be impressed by it all over again.

Vitality and a sense of excitement were the glory of the theatre when Woollcott was in his heyday—and I am convinced that the period when he was a drama critic was his heyday and all the rest was anti-climax—and because he possessed those qualities to a high degree he was an important and significant figure of the epoch. In both the American drama and American life of those days the gusto and excitement concealed a certain ominous shallowness and frustration, and the fact that Woollcott had those qualities, too, made him even more representative of his time and place.

Although there are a few inevitable but unimportant errors in the book—Nathan called Woollcott the Seidlitz Powder of, not in, Times Square, for one—Mr. Adams has done his job ably and interestingly. Alexander Woollcott, despite everything, supplied an enlivening moment in a racy and enlivening chapter of American culture, and the Adams biography serves him well.

RICHARD WATTS JR.

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Two Views of Bigness

Big Democracy, by Paul H. Appleby. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 197 pages. $2.75.
Big Government: Can We Control It? by Merlo J. Pusey. With a Foreword by Charles A. Beard. New York: Harper and Brothers. 240 pages. $2.50.

PLATO'S DICTUM that democracy is a "charming form of government, full of variety and disorder," is given meaning in these two thoughtful studies of our present apparatus of government. The books are, in a sense, complementary; read together, they afford a balanced picture both of the "variety" and the "disorder" that are characteristic facets of representative government today.

Paul H. Appleby qualifies for his analysis of bureaucracy, on the basis of a long and distinguished career in the Department of Agriculture under Henry Wallace and, more recently, as Assistant Director of the Budget. Those like Mr. Appleby, who bring to public service integrity and social vision, are richly rewarded in the knowledge that they are contributing to the attainment of America's democratic aspirations. For, as Mr. Appleby shows persuasively, our federal bureaucracy is doing its job remarkably well.

He relies heavily, for illustrative material, on his experience in the Department of Agriculture. He examines this vast federal enterprise and discusses its interaction with Congress, with the public and with other executive agencies. We get a picture of huge organizations—the Department of Agriculture alone employs the services of some 300,000 persons—which for all their size and complexity are surprisingly efficient. In recent years it has been the sport of various congressional committees and journalistic critics to carp at the inefficiency, waste and red tape of bureaucratic activity. Mr. Appleby shows that it is conducted in much the same manner as any well run private business. The basic approach and procedures are usually the same—when they differ, the comparison is more often to the advantage of the government organization, because its decisions are less likely to be conditioned by private, pecuniary motives. The public servant is more responsive than is his business counterpart, to external criticism. This is because in our system of "checks and balances," the operation of government is closely scrutinized by congressional committees, pressure groups and the press. This is a good influence—it keeps bureaucracy alert to the dynamic requirements of the people to a degree impossible with any private enterprise.

Mr. Appleby discusses frankly the touchy subject of patronage. Contrary to popular impression, federal departments normally have comparatively few "spoilsmen" jobs available at the more important levels. (During the war emergency, civil-service requirements for most war-agency positions have been waived, but unquestionably they will be restored once federal activity goes back on a peacetime basis.) Patronage *per se* is not entirely pernicious. Properly administered, it makes for more understanding and coöperation between the legislative and executive branches, and "the major party, which ordinarily controls both of them, offers practically the sole means of establishing such unity. And patronage serves to bring the two branches to at least some little area of common ground." Where patronage has to be handed out, the author proposes that the politician be asked to submit a broad list of recommended applicants. The qualifications of the candidates will then be carefully scrutinized by responsible administrators, who alone will make the final selection. In essence, this is the procedure which every careful private employer follows.

Big Democracy is in no sense an apologia for bureaucracy. It is, rather, an impressive appeal for more understanding on the part of the American people. As such it is a significant contribution. Although deeply analytical and a bit too heavy for popular consumption, it deserves reading by every one of the millions in government service—it could do much to dispel the sense of frustration that the average civil servant feels about his job. It further should be required reading in the colleges. Too few qualified young graduates are today electing public service as their life-work—Mr. Appleby shows that being a "bureaucrat" is a worthy calling.

Big Government: Can We Control It? is strikingly similar in approach and treatment to Thomas K. Finletter's *Can Representative Government Do the Job?* which, by coincidence, appeared on almost the same date. Like Finletter, Mr. Pusey does not hold with those who envision a postwar stripping down of government to the more modest proportions of pre-emergency days. The trend is rather toward even greater centralization projected into the indefinite future. How to harness this rising tide of centralized power is, in the field of domestic policy, the "most important question with which the American people will have to grapple during the next decade."

Mr. Pusey subjects official Washington during the Roosevelt Administration to critical scrutiny. He submits that it has been a "makeshift, personalized" government

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and objects to the methods employed in setting up and administering our wartime agencies. He castigates the late President for having "packed" the Supreme Court with men "chosen primarily because of their political leanings and previous executive connections." There is an extensive review of the Administration's unsatisfactory relations with Congress, due in part, he concedes, to the cumbersome, outmoded machinery of the legislative branch. In a chapter headed "Grass Roots of Freedom," the author severely indicts what he considers the government's lack of candor in letting the public in on the facts behind official policy. The study concludes with a series of excellent suggestions for corrective measures. The author advances a complete program of government reorganization that is sound, realizable and certainly very necessary.

Mr. Pusey is an editorial writer for the Washington *Post*. His approach to the problem is therefore that of the journalist—as such it is geared more to the news values of the daily press; in short, it lacks perspective. The source for virtually all of his critical material, is the workings of the federal government during the recent years of the present emergency. The implication is inescapable that the "disorder" and excesses of this period stem from organic weaknesses in the structure of the government itself. Any such conclusion, however, is unwarranted—we have every right to expect that once the present emergency is over, our administrative processes will again operate at an even tempo. As a democratic people, we have before cast off the impedimenta of a war situation once it has passed, and we shall successfully do so again. This unconscious "slanting" by the author does not, however, vitiate the general excellence and timeliness of his book. It deserves to be widely read.

HARVEY J. BRESLER

Lincoln's Foreign Policy

Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, by Jay Monaghan. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 505 pages. $4.

LIKE MOST of our great Presidents, Lincoln was a moral hero not only to his own people, but to struggling radicals everywhere. In a fine work of narrative history, which combines in rare fashion humor, imagination and scholarly research, Jay Monaghan reminds us of Lincoln's importance as a world figure.

Lincoln's central diplomatic problem was to fend off British and French intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. He was afraid that need for cotton, fear of Northern tariff policies and the desire to split a potential rival would cause England to support the Confederacy, and he knew that the rebels had the sympathy of the British ruling classes. That his fears were not realized was due in good part to circumstances beyond his influence. War profits reaped by British manufacturers and shippers in time outweighed the inconvenience they suffered from lack of cotton, and after 1862 the chances of foreign intervention rapidly dwindled.

But Lincoln was not passive. He launched a concerted propaganda campaign to convince the people of Europe that the Union was fighting for republican principles against an aristocratic slave power. One of his first acts after Bull Run was to offer a command in the Union Army to Garibaldi, the symbol of world republicanism. The Italian patriot refused; among other reasons, he would fight only in a war for emancipation. But emancipation was not yet in prospect. Whether or not Lincoln preferred to have it so, a large body of opinion in the North and the strategic border states would have refused at the outset to support a war fought to free the slaves. A resolution of Congress early in 1861 stated that the North's aim was to bring the South back into the Union with slavery intact.

Viewed without sentiment, the Civil War thus appears as an attempt on the part of the North to deny national self-determination to the majority of Southern whites who desired it. The Union cause was, at the beginning, the cause of centralized nationalism pure and simple; and in the grand political strategy of the conflict it was the Federals, not the boys in gray, who took the offensive. Until emancipation was proclaimed, the war lacked the transcendent moral sanction of a crusade for freedom.

In the face of these facts, Lincoln's prompt success in selling the Union cause to European democrats was no mean accomplishment. The North's war, he told the world, was a defense of a status quo in which the common man had a voice in his destiny and a chance to get ahead. It was a test to determine whether republican government could prevail over an assault from within by forces which were not numerous enough to control it by democratic and pacific means. In Europe republicans took heart from the Union victory. But since the Emancipation Proclamation itself was intended partly as a concession to European opinion, it seems that European liberalism did more for the radical cause in America than Union victory did for liberalism in Europe.

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Outright intervention was but one of several delicate problems with which Lincoln had to cope. Mr. Monaghan traces them all with enthusiasm. His book is unlikely to affect prevailing interpretations, and at a few points one may question his judgment and his sensibilities. He cannot understand, for example, why a delegation of free Negroes sat staring mutely when Lincoln proposed to solve the race question by colonizing the freedmen in Central America. But mere conventionality of viewpoint has never been a barrier to the success of a popular book of history, and on other grounds Mr. Monaghan's has a great deal to recommend it. No doubt it will take a prominent place in the Lincoln literature. RICHARD HOFSTADTER

A Reader's List

PINE, STREAM AND PRAIRIE, by James Gray (Knopf, $3.50). Despite a field-and-stream title, this is not a vacationist's guide to the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin. It first cites data on population and resources and then strikes to the quick of its assignment. Here is a crisp and valuable critique on the agrarian revolts as personified by such leaders as Ignatius Donnelly, the flinty elder Lindbergh, the gallant La Follette and Floyd B. Olson. They are depicted as political nonconformists battling for a greater decency in the social order. Capable vignettes are also presented on thinkers like Veblen and Frederick J. Turner and on the architect Frank Lloyd Wright, and the cities get a thoughtful delineation. In short, what emerges is possibly the best brief introduction to the region now available.

PLAINVILLE, U. S. A., by James West (Columbia, $2.75). An anthropologist's study of certain phases in the daily life of a contemporary American rural community. The author spent more than a year in an on-the-spot study of the folkways and mores of the inhabitants of a small Midwestern hamlet whose existence centers around farming. The result is this rather minor-league *Middletown*. The research is thorough and the conclusions sound, but the book is somewhat dated because the field work was done in 1939-40. A more recent project, assessing the impact of the war on "Plainville," would be rewarding. The book's principal interest, for other than sociologists, will be for those with nostalgic attachments to the small towns of their youth.

LUMBER AND LABOR, by Vernon H. Jensen (Farrar and Rinehart, $3). This is the fifth in the "Labor in Twentieth Century America" series. It surveys a field of labor in which there are few definitive studies. The lumber industry, the author explains, moved across the continent to the Great Lakes and the Far West devouring forests and men and leaving desolate cut-over regions behind. Today it remains largely a frontier activity in which the workers, hungry for unionization, fought some of the most bitter individualists in American industry. Dr. Jensen recites with considerable detail the history of unionism in lumbering. Books of this kind are often burdened with voluminous data; it is to Dr. Jensen's credit that he subordinates statistics while telling the major story of labor relations. The volume is a useful addition to the literature of labor problems.

TWO BILLION ACRE FARM, by Robert West Howard (Doubleday, Doran, $2.50). The farm is of course the United States, and Mr. Howard, with years of agricultural journalism behind him, takes his readers all over it. Farmers' coöperatives are, to Mr. Howard, the peak of our communal achievement, and throughout our history his hero is the farmer, whom he calls "the uncommon man," devoting much of his technicolored prose to that figure's unique virtues of self-dependence, family affection and religious conviction. The villain, naturally, is the industrialist, and the devil, literally, is industrial centralization, which leads to urbanization and dependence on cash-income jobs. Mr. Howard's too-little-known facts and agricultural figures make interesting reading; his inevitably chunking factories, fussing trains, twirtling thrushes and tootling Iowans make one nervous. So does his rugged, confused dismissal of New Deal efforts to help agriculturists.

Crime and Punishment

CORONER'S VERDICT: ACCIDENT, by Richard Keverne (McKay, $2). As Janet Warren's best friend, Gwen Darcy knew the successful young English portrait painter had no reason to take her own life, yet that was the implication of the verdict on the body found drowned in the river back of the Black Boy Inn. Gwen persuades Hugh Merrow, new proprietor of the Black Boy, to help her discover the cause of Janet's death, and their amateur efforts turn up a trio of thorough bad hats. A lively and literate job, with some nice English countryside thrown in.

ANY SHAPE OR FORM, by Elizabeth Daly (Farrar and Rinehart, $2). An elaborate Connecticut estate furnishes the scene for some pretty weird antics on the part of a group of assorted snobs, plus one sun-worshiper, wealthy old Josephine Malcolm. In fact, Henry Gamadge, the criminologist, is the only bearable person at the tea party which is the prelude to Mrs. Malcolm's murder. Since the victim was within a few paces of him when she was shot, Gamadge feels obliged to ferret out the killer, but his heart doesn't seem to be in the job. Neither was this reader's. A terrific letdown from the A-1 work Miss Daly had been giving us lately. E. H.

Contributors

Percy Winner spent 14 years in Western Europe as a foreign correspondent, half of them in Italy and Germany under fascism, and was for three years an OWI Deputy Director for Field Operations. The *New Republic* printed articles by him on fascism in 1926 and 1930.

Thomas F. Reynolds has been White House correspondent for the Chicago *Sun* since that paper was founded. Before that he was for some years White House correspondent for the United Press.

Seymour E. Harris, associate professor of Economics at Harvard, was formerly director of the Office of Export-Import Price Control of the OPA. He is the author of several books on foreign trade and monetary problems, including *Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy*.

Fleet Street is the pseudonym of a London journalist and publicist.

James Montagnes is a free-lance journalist who is a Canadian correspondent for a number of American newspapers and magazines.

Richard Watts Jr. is the former dramatic critic of the New York *Herald Tribune*.

Harvey J. Bresler, executive and lawyer, has just returned from overseas duty as Economics officer with Civil Affairs, a branch of the AMG. He has contributed to the New York *Herald Tribune Books*, *Political Science Quarterly* and other publications.

Richard Hofstadter, assistant professor of History at the University of Maryland, now on leave, is at work on his second book, *Men and Ideas in American Politics*.

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